Vol. 34, no. 3: Full Issue by Editorial Board, Dicta
Denver Law Review 
Volume 34 Issue 3 Article 10 
1957 
Vol. 34, no. 3: Full Issue 
Dicta Editorial Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
34 Dicta (1957). 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 




The Denver Bar Association
The Colorado Bar Association




Vol. XXXIV, No. 3 May-June, 1957
Published bi-monthly by the Denver Bar Association,
the Colorado Bar Association and the University of
Denver College of Law.
CONTENTS
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF COLORADO CASES ------------------------- 129
by Willson Hurt
FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF DAMAGES ------------------ 137
by Everett E. Smith
SECONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS OF SECURITIES -------------------------------------- 156
by Leland E. Modesitt
COLORADO STATUTES--SOME CHANGES MADE BY THE
FORTY-FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY 170
by Charles S. Thomas
THE FATE OF THE COURT BILLS IN THE FORTY-FIRST
G E N E R A L A S S E M B L Y ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 176
by Peter H. Holme, Jr.
N O T E S --- . ..._ . .--- ..- ..------------------- ....-  ------ ----------------------------------------- 1 7 8
by Robert B. Yegge
CASE COMMENTS - 182
EDITORIAL STAFF
EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor, University of Denver, College of Law: Jim R. Carrigan
Denver Bar Association: John Fleming Kelly
Colorado Bar Association: Robert Davison, Stanton D. Rosenbaum
COLLEGE OF LAW
Managing Editor: Melvin Coffee
Article Editor: John M. Lindsey
Note Editor: Dwight D. Murphey
Case Cowiment Editor: Edward S. Barlock
Business Manager: James Skinner
Staff: Rachel R. Allen, Richard Bangert, John Bush, John Deisch,
Thomas A. Nelson, Robert Pierce, Robert B. Yegge, Richard
Zarlcngo.
ADVERTISING AGENT: Rocky Mountain Recorder Publishing
Company, 2400 Curtis, Denver 5; AL. 5-0001.
SUBSCRIPTIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS: Mail all contributions
and orders for subscriptions or back issues to Dicta Business
Manager, University of Denver, College of Law, Denver,
Colorado.
The submissicn to the editors of articles of interest in the profession is
invited. The opinions expressed herein, unlss otherwise indicated, are not
necessarily those of the associations, the College of Law, or the Editors.
Unless otherwise indicated herein, permission is hereby granted to reprint
or copy. with proper credit, any article originating in this publication.
Price: 75c per copy: $4.00 per year.
the last decade has
altered many legal concepts....
QUICK ACCESS TO CASE LAW BASED ON
THE FACTUAL SITUATIONS ARISING TO-
DAY IS A PARAMOUNT NECESSTY
all fhese late cases
are found in the
CASES HANDED DOWN FROM ALL
COURTS DURING A DECADE OF UN-
PARALLELED CHANGES AND DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN AMERICAN CASE LAW
ARE DIGESTED UNDER ONE ALPHA-
BETICAL ARRANGEMENT
ASK ABOUT OUR ATTRACTIVE OFFER
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
ST. PAUL 2, MINN.
May-June, 1957
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIP,
AND AGENCY*
By WILLSON HURT
Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver
Corporations:
The case of Miller v. Hepnert is the sequel to Hepner v. Miller.'
The Supreme Court in Hepner v. Miller had held "that a court has
no power, in the absence of a permissive statute, to dissolve a going
solvent corporation; to appoint a receiver to sell its assets, and di-
vide the proceeds of such sale among the stockholders. ' '8 The
court ordered the case remanded, with directions to discharge the
receiver and to dismiss the action.
Miller v. Hepner involved the question whether the trial court
was correct in fixing: (a) the receiver's fee at $100 a month for the
twelve months he acted as such, (b) $750 as the fee for the receiv-
er's attorney, and (c) the fee of appraisers retained by the receiver
to appraise the corporate real estate. The second question was
whether such expenses should be charged against the plaintiff
stockholders who brought the action for the appointment of the re-
ceiver. The trial court decided all these issues against the plaintiffs.
Held, judgment modified by reducing the receiver's fee and his at-
torney's fee by fifty per cent. The supreme court held with the trial
court that such fees were chargeable to plaintiff stockholders, who
had improperly obtained the appointment of the receiver. But, "As
to the fees for appraisal of the real estate, it is to be observed that
this appraisal was premature on the part of the receiver and it is
only fair and just that he be directed to pay this item."
4
In Fehr v. Hadden,5 plaintiffs were stockholders in a mutual non-
profit corporation organized under the Colorado statutes for the
purpose of acquiring and distributing water for domestic purposes
in Jefferson County. All water users were required to own stock in
the corporation. The plaintiffs brought action against the corpora-
tion and its directors, to have an election of directors declared in-
valid on the grounds: (1) that certain record stock owners allowed
to vote at the election were building contractors, and should not
have been allowed to vote, because they might dispose of their stock
to purchasers of homes, and that they, therefore, were not bona fide
stockholders for the purpose of voting; and (2) that certain record
stockholders were not bona fide equitable owners of stock because
they had contracted to sell the stock to others, and consequently
should not have been allowed to vote. The trial court entered judg-
ment for the defendant directors. Held, judgment affirmed. (a) The
Colorado statute' provides that, unless the articles of incorporation
of a Colorado corporation shall provide to the contrary, every share-
holder of record is entitled at every shareholders' meeting to one
* This article conclude% the review of cases decided between Nov. 1, 1955 and Jan. 1, 1957.
For six other annual review articles see 34 DICTA 69-122 (1957).
1 132 Cola. 395, 292 P.2d 968 (1955).
130 Cola. 243, 274 P.2d 818 (1954); see Note, 32 DICTA 314 (1955).
S 130 Colo. at 246, 274 P.2d at 819.
4 132 Colo. at 399, 292 P.2d at 970.
s 300 P.2d 533 (1956).
eColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-7 (1953).
DICTA
May-June, 1957
vote for every share standing in his name on the books of the cor-
poration. There was nothing to indicate that the articles of incor-
poration provided for any limitation on voting rights. Consequently,
the building contractors' intention to sell their stock at some time in
the future did not disqualify the stock from being voted. (b) The
Colorado stock transfer act expressly permits a corporation to "rec-
ognize the exclusive right of a person registered on its books as the
owner of shares ... to vote as such owner. . .. -7 And the same act
contains the definition: "(i) 'Title' means legal title and does not
include a merely equitable or beneficial ownership or interest."8
Therefore, the mere fact that certain stockholders of record had con-
tracted to sell their stock would not preclude them from voting that
stock.
The case of Colorado Builders' Supply Co. v. Hinman Brothers
Construction Co. involved the question of what constitutes doing
business within the state by a foreign corporation so as to make it
amenable to process served on its employees within the state. The
defendant corporation, an Illinois corporation, had not qualified to
do business in Colorado, nor had it designated an agent for process.
It manufactured heavy earth-moving machinery in its plants in
Illinois and Georgia, and sold its products in Colorado, and portions
of Nebraska and Wyoming, through an exclusive distributor, the
plaintiff, a corporation.
Id. § 31-9-3.
* Id. § 31-9-21.
9 304 P.2d 892 (1956).
A 4nnouncin
A SPECIAL MINERAL LAW ISSUE OF DICTA
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The plaintiff was the defendant's distributor for just less than
a month, from May 1, 1953, to May 29, 1953, and from the latter date
to October 12, 1953, the defendant had no distributor in Colorado.
In September 1953, one Murphy became the defendant's district rep-
resentative. Murphy's first efforts were toward finding a suitable
distributor fo his company, and on October 12, 1953, Liberty Com-
pany became the distributor in Colorado. Murphy made his services
available to Liberty in providing the personnel with a working
knowledge of the equipment and in giving sales training to Liberty
employees. On some occasions, he accompanied Liberty salesmen in
meeting prospective customers. At all times following his appoint-
ment, Murphy spent a very substantial portion of his time outside
Colorado, although he lived in Denver because of its central loca-
tion. He made written reports of his work to the defendant corpora-
tion. He was paid a fixed salary by the defendant, drew no com-
missions, and was not supplied with an office.
In addition to the district representative, the defendant corpora-
tion employed one Slade as a service engineer. The area to which
he was assigned comprised all the United States west of and includ-
ing Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, as well
as portions of Canada, Alaska, and Hawaii. His duties were to train
and counsel distributors on problems of maintenance, repair, and
upkeep of machines made by defendant. He worked under direct
orders from the factory, and was in no way responsible to the dis-
tributor. When Liberty became a distributor in Colorado, its em-
ployees were not familiar with the equipment and had to be trained
to service and maintain it. Slade occasionally went with the distrib-
utor's service man on a repair job, because the distributor's em-
ployee was too inexperienced to locate the trouble with the equip-
ment. Slade was paid a salary by the defendant, and the defendant
was not reimbursed by the distributor in the few instances in which
Liberty called upon Slade to assist in repair work.
The plaintiff served process, in an action in personam against
defendant corporation, on both Murphy and Slade, referring to each,
in the return of service, as "agent and principal employee" of the
defendant. The defendant moved to quash the service of process on
the grounds: (1) that it was not engaged in business in Colorado;
and (2) that the persons served were not agents for accepting serv-
ice of process. After hearing evidence, the trial court determined
We Will Render Any Possible Assistance in
Connection With Your Law Book Needs.
American Jurisprudence Hillyer's Annot. Forms of Pleading
Texts on All Subjects and Practice
U. S. Reports, Law Ed. American Lw Reports
American Jurisprudence Federal Code Annotated
Legal Forms, Annot.
LAWYERS CO-OP PUBLISHING CO.
BENDER MOSS CO.
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that the defendant corporation was not "doing business" within
Colorado so as to be amenable to process served within the state.
Held, judgment affirmed.
In Western Homes, Inc. v. District Court,"° it was held: "A cor-
poration can conspire and can commit a tort."" The alleged tort was
common law deceit.
Partnership:
The only partnership case found is Bennett v. Gardner.12 In that
case the plaintiff brought an action against his former partner for
an accounting. He alleged a loan of $800 to the former partner and,
on information and belief, alleged that $5,000 was the approximate
amount due for assets sold and unaccounted for by the former part-
ner. The trial court was unsatisfied with the account filed by the
defendant on court order, because the court considered it incom-
plete. The defendant's counsel claimed that the defendant could
not submit any other records. Thereupon, on motion of the plain-
tiff, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff for $5,800 as prayed
for in the complaint, "since any other course of action appeared use-
less." 1" Held, reversed and remanded to the trial court, with direc-
tion to vacate the judgment against defendant and grant a new trial.
It was encumbent on the plaintiff to establish his case by evidence
of the amount due under the accounting, "and the court cannot,
without proof, assume that the amount due plaintiff is the sum
named in his complaint."'
4
In the supreme court's report of the Bennett case, it is diffi-
cult to discover whether the court considered that either a real part-
nership or a real joint adventure had been formed. It speaks of "the
so-called partnership agreement." Assuming that partnership law
was involved, the case poses a real problem for the dormant part-
ner who asks for a court accounting, on dissolution, from the active
partner who was in entire charge of the business. When the active
partner refuses to file a complete account as ordered by the trial
court, is the court powerless to give relief to the dormant partner?
Maybe the trial court could cite the active partner for contempt of
court, but that would not benefit the dormant partner in a pecuniary
way. Strangely, not a single case is cited by the Supreme Court for
its holding, nor did it cite the Uniform Partnership Act,1 adopted
in Colorado.
Agency:
Cases concerning the relationship of principal and agent, and
master and servant, are included here, but workmen's compensation
cases are omitted.
Three cases deal with real estate brokers. The first is McCul-
lough v. Thompson.6 In that case, the defendants, the owners of cer-
tain real property, listed the property with the plaintiffs, real estate
10 133 Colo. 304, 296 P.2d 460 (1956).
11 Id. at 310, 296 P.2d at 463.
"133 Colo. 33, 291 P.2d 705 (1955).
uId. at 37, 291 P.2d at 707.
14 Id. at 38, 291 P.2d at 708.
"Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 104-1-1 to 43 (1953).
1 133 Colo. 352, 295 P.2d 221 (1956).
SACHS-LILLOR- CORPORATIOn SEHLS- ALPIBE 5-3422
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agents, for sale at a certain price. The defendants agreed in writing
to pay the agents a commission of five per cent if a purchaser ready,
willing, and able to buy the property on the terms prescribed was
found within sixty days. The agents did find such a purchaser with-
in sixty days, but the defendants refused to go through with the
sale. Thereupon, the plaintiffs sued for the agreed commission, with
interest, and obtained a judgment for that amount. Held, judgment
affirmed. "Under the pertinent statute ... they were entitled to
their commission."'17
In Ginsberg v. Frankenberg,' the defendant gave a non-exclus-
ive listing of his property to the plaintiff, a real estate broker who
was also an attorney. The contract of listing was drafted by the
plaintiff, and provided for a commission to the plaintiff if he found
a purchaser willing to pay the amount asked by the defendant.
Plaintiff was unable to find such a purchaser. Defendant subse-
quently sold the property through another agent, and paid the lat-
ter a commission. Plaintiff sued the defendant, claiming he had
earned a commission. In the trial court, after the plaintiff had put
in his evidence, the defendant moved for a nonsuit and dismissal
of the complaint. This motion was granted. Held, judgment af-
firmed. The supreme court stated that if there was any ambiguity
in the contract, it must be construed against the writer. The court
then went on to say: "Recovery in this case is not only barred by
the decisions of this court, but by .... " the statute."
In Heady v. Tomlinson,2 0 a real estate broker brought action
to recover a commission for effecting a sale of real estate for the
defendant. The defendant had been negotiating with one Larreau
regarding selling to Larreau certain wheat land owned by the de-
fendant. Later, Larreau introduced the plaintiff to defendant; and
upon the plaintiff's representation to the defendant that he would
have some cash buyers on the defendant's land the next day, the
defendant agreed to allow the plaintiff to show the land for sale
and to pay a commission to the plaintiff if a sale was made. Larreau
later decided to buy the land and he informed the plaintiff of his
desire. The plaintiff showed the defendant's land to certain pros-
pective cash buyers, but a sale did not materialize. The plaintiff
rr Id. at 355, 295 P.2d at 222 [citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117-2-1 (1953)].
18 133 Colo. 382, 295 P.2d 1036 (1956)..
1Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117-2-1 (1953).
°299 P.2d 120 (1956).
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then informed the defendant of Larreau's offer, and the defendant
informed the plaintiff that he would accept Larreau's offer. Sub-
sequently a contract of sale was entered into between the defend-
ant and Larreau, at which time the plaintiff was present. Plaintiff
demanded his commission from the defendant, but the defendant
refused to pay it, on the basis that he, and not the plaintiff, had
produced the buyer. The case was tried to the court without a jury,
and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. Held, judgment re-
versed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment
for the defendant. The plaintiff did not produce a purchaser. De-
fendant and the purchaser had already been negotiating for the
sale of the property, and plaintiff did nothing to induce the buyer
to purchase the property.
In Weick v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co.,2' suit was brought
by the administrator of the estate of decedent to recover commis-
sions which plaintiff claimed that his decedent had earned while
employed as sales manager for the defendant automobile distribut-
ing company. The contract between the plaintiff's intestate and the
company was silent as to when the plaintiff's commission would be
deemed earned. Under the contract, the plaintiff's intestate was to
receive a certain per cent of the sale price of all cars sold by the
defendant company, as his commission as sales manager. Plaintiff
contended that the contract included cars sold during his intestate's
lifetime but delivered afterwards. The practice of the defendant
company was to pay the commissions on the fifteenth day of the
month following the last month of each quarter. The trial court held
that the plaintiff's intestate was not entitled to commissions on cars
sold prior to his death but delivered afterwards. Held, reversed.
"The basic error lies in the failure of the trial court to recognize
the distinction between the time when a commission is earned and
the time when it may become due and payable.
22
Garden of the Gods Village v. Hellman21 involved the distinc-
tion between the relationship of principal-agent and the relation-
ship of employer-independent contractor. Defendant corporation
was engaged in developing its real property for the purpose of sub-
dividing the land into lots to be sold to the public. Heyn was presi-
dent of the corporation and controlled practically all of its issued
stock. The corporation, through Heyn, employed two brothers at a
stipulated wage per hour to blast out some large rocks that were
on the land. One of the brothers suggested to Heyn that about a
hundred holes should be bored and then fired with light loads of
blasting material. However, to save cost, Heyn directed that only
four or five holes be bored and then fired with heavy loads. As a
result of the brothers' following Heyn's directions, plaintiff's nearby
building was materially damaged by concussion from the blasting.
The plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment against the defend-
ant corporation. Held, judgment affirmed. The court first found
that the brothers were not independent contractors but were ser-
vants of the corporation, and "it was liable for any damage result-
21 303 P.2d 685 (1956).
= Id. at 687.
' 133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956).
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ing from their operations .... ",24 The court then observed that the
work was of an inherently dangerous character, and in such a case
an employer cannot evade liability by engaging an independent
contractor.
The case of Radosevich v. Pegues25 involved the question wheth-
er an attorney, who has entered his appearance on behalf of a party
to an action, may compromise and settle his client's claim without
the knowledge and consent of his client. The facts are somewhat
involved, but it will suffice for our purposes to say that the su-
preme court followed settled Colorado authority in stating that the
attorney "may not compromise his client's cause without express
authority."2 6
Two master and servant cases were decided by the Colorado
Supreme Court. (Workmen's compensation cases are omitted here.)
One of the master-servant cases, interesting on its facts, is Lom-
bardy v. Stees.27 Defendant was the owner of the Pioneer Hotel and
bar in Steamboat Springs, and one Brasier was in his employ as
bartender. Brasier was instructed not to serve any patron who had
had too much to drink. The plaintiff entered the bar one night,
drank several glasses of beer, and then argued with the bartender
over whether the latter had given him the proper change. The
plaintiff claimed that, later, the bartender asked him to leave, and
when he was a few feet from the door the bartender came from
behind the bar and beat him with a golf club handle. The bartender
claimed that the plaintiff called him a "dirty name" and that he
thought the plaintiff was looking for trouble with him personally
and not with the patrons of the bar. The plaintiff sued the defend-
ant and the bartender for his injuries. The first trial was before a
jury, which failed to reach a verdict. Another trial was had with
no service being had on the bartender and no appearance being
made for him. The court instructed the jury as to acts of the ser-
vant entirely for his own purposes being beyond the scope of his
employment, and added:
"The fact, however, if it be a fact, that at the time of
and in the perpetration of the wrongful act complained of,
the servant was combining some private purpose of his
own with the business of his master is not of itself suffi-
cient to take the wrongful act outside of the scope of the
authority and employment, and the master will not on that
account be relieved from liability." '28
Counsel for the defendant objected to the instruction, but was over-
ruled. The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff for $20,000,
and judgment was entered thereon. Held, judgment reversed and
the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint. The
supreme court stated that the above-quoted instruction was erron-
eous, because there was no evidence in the case to show that the
bartender was acting partly in behalf of his master.
24 Id. at 294, 294 P.2d at 601.
11 133 Colo. 148, 292 P.2d 741 (1956).
= Id. at 152, 292 P.2d at 743 (dictum).
132 Colo. 570, 290 P.2d 1110 (1955).
2 Id. at 575, 290 P.2d at 1112.
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It seems to us that the supreme court was somewhat naive in
its examination of some of the evidence. For instance, the court
said: "There was a stick, apparently the handle of a golf club, in
the bar and it is not shown by the evidence that it was used for
any purpose in the operation of the bar as such."29 Would it not be
more realistic to say that the stick was kept there, behind the bar,
for some useful purpose connected with the operation of the bar?
It certainly was not kept there for playing golf, since it was useless
as a golf club.
Whether the bartender was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment was properly a jury question, and since the evidence on
that point was conflicting, the direction given by the trial court
was proper. The local jury was in a much better position to deter-
mine who was telling the truth than was the appellate court, which
read the abstract of record and the briefs in Denver.
A case equally interesting on its facts as the preceding one, but
not as doubtfully decided is Bidlake v. Shirley Hotel.30 There the
plaintiff drove his car up to the entrance of the Shirley-Savoy Ho-
tel, operated by the defendant in Denver, preparatory to register-
ing as a guest. He was asked by the defendant's uniformed em-
ployee if he desired his car stored. Plaintiff answered in the affirm-
ative and gave the car keys to the employee, a night porter. In-
stead of taking the car to the garage, the employee used it for a
"joy-ride" and damaged it. Upon the plaintiff's recovering the car
the next day, valuable personal property had been taken from the
glove compartment. Plaintiff sued the defendant hotel for the
damage to the car and the loss of the personal property. Defendant
set up in defense that the employee had no authority to take the
plaintiff's automobile to a garage and that the employee converted
the automobile to his own use. The defendant gave evidence tend-
ing to show: that it was not the practice of employees of the hotel
to take guests' cars to the nearby garage for storage; that the door-
man ordinarily was the person who would take the car keys of a
guest who wished his car stored; that the doorman would give the
guest a claim-check and would call the garage to have it send a
shag-boy to come for the car; that the employees had been instruct-
ed that only the supervisor and the doorman should ever drive
move a guest's car and then only in an emergency; and that it was
not the custom in Denver to permit porters or bellhops to drive
automobiles of guests arriving by automobile. The trial was to the
court, and at the conclusion of all the evidence judgment was en-
tered in favor of the defendant. Held, judgment reversed. A guest
registering at a hotel has no duty to inquire as to the limitations of
an employee's authority. Defendant had vested the uniformed em-
ployee with apparent authority to accept on its behalf the delivery
of the plaintiff's automobile for storage.
= Id. at 572, 290 P.2d at 1111.
o 133 Colo. 166, 292 P.2d 749 (1956).
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FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF DAMAGES
By EVERETT E. SMITH
Everett E. Smith received his B.A.
and LL.B. degrees from the Univer-
sity of Minnesota. He is a former
Attorney, Trial Attorney and Ap-
pellate Counsel in the Internal Rev-
enue Service and served during
World War II as an assistant Judge
Advocate with the Third Army in
the European Theater. He is a
member of the Denver, Colorado
and American Bar Associations and
has contributed articles to DICTA,
the American Bar Association Jour-
nal and the Minnesota Law Re-
view.
A recent, responsible review of the law of damages begins with
this sentence "Probably no branch of the law is more confused, less
considered, or more often applied than damages." 1 A United States
Supreme Court Justice who once had been Chief Counsel for the
Internal Revenue Service described the tax law as "a field beset
with invisible boomerangs '2 and, on another occasion, as "so com-
plex as to be the despair of judges."'
It is the boundary of these two distinctive fields of law which
we propose to survey.4 It ought to be an area of special interest to
the general practitioner.' To him who is already in the case the
litigant ordinarily will turn for advice and assistance concerning
the tax consequences of a contemplated suit, a proposal of settle-
ment or a favorable or unfavorable judgment. As for the tax spe-
cialist, his competence in his specialty depends on his knowledge of
its points of contact with the various other branches of law, such
as damages. A tax lawyer ignorant of general legal problems and
principles is as handicapped as a general practitioner who does
not recognize a tax problem when he sees it.
It is not the objective of this article, of course, to make a tax
expert of anyone, even in the area under review and least of all to
minimize the general practitioner's need for the cooperation of the
tax specialist in specific instances and at crucial steps. Equally far
from our aim is offering an exhaustive analysis and collection of au-
thorities which will furnish a ready-made answer to any specific
problem now puzzling a tax expert. Rather, it is our modest pur-
pose to give recent illustrations of some actual tax problems which
have arisen from litigation and caused enough difficulty to find a
place in the reports; to place them in perspective; and to provide
IDevelopments in the Law-Damages, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 113 (1947).
2See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U. S. 6, 12 (1952).
. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 498 (1944).
4 For a trail-blazing article which covers the same territory, and more, see Plumb, Income Tax
on Gains and Losses in Litigation, 25 Cornell L. Q. 221, 26 Cornell L. Q. 16 (1940). See also Mertens,
Federal Income Taxation § 5.21 (1942); Note, Taxation of Damage Recoveries from Litigation, 40
Cornell L. Q. 345 (1955).
,,No other branch of the law touches human activities at so many points." Mr. Justice Jackson
speaking for the Court in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 494-5 (1944).
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a readily available reference to the decisions and rulings which have
dealt with those matters. Accordingly, the law as applied in given
cases takes priority in the discussion over our own ideas of what
it should be in the same cases, in unreported settlements, or in
hypothetical situations. Finally, we usually have placed the em-
phasis on the principles which determine the answers rather than
on the answers themselves.
As used herein, damages includes judgments and settlements
interchangeably. 6 Those judgments and settlements relating to di-
vorce and to the annulment of marriages, though forming a part of
the general subject now under consideration, are governed by spe-
cial rules and for that reason are excluded from the scope of the
present discourse. The question when a reportable or deductible
judgment for damages should be taken into account (involving
such doctrines as accrual and constructive receipt) is likewise be-
yond the pale of our attention. For present purposes, but present
purposes only, we indulge the pleasant assumption that all judg-
ments are collectible by the creditor and payable by the debtor
without great difficulty or delay.
In general, gains and losses suffered in litigation are not in a
class by themselves. They are merely special instances of the actual
or intended application of principles of federal income tax law
which embrace other classes of gains and losses. It follows from this
fact that the tax treatment of damages and settlements seldom, if
6 Cf. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 196 (1938), "We think that the distinction sought to be made
between acquisition through such a judgment and acquisition by a compromise agreement in lieu of





ever, depends on such common-law characterizations as torts, con-
tracts and trusts. The important categories are those of the revenue
law, and this means that the text of the applicable code should be
kept in mind.
The code, it must be conceded, rarely contains a complete and
final statement of the governing law, for here, even more than in
the case of other statutes, the gloss of administrative rulings and
court decisions is important. So true is this that it is difficult to
say whether the code should be considered a starting point rather
than a point of departure. Notwithstanding these reservations, the
text of the code is at least a point of reference or orientation which
should be kept in view, like a lighthouse, by all the legal mariners
who seek the harbor of minimized taxes.
To conclude these introductory remarks, a litigant who has ob-
tained a favorable, final judgment, or received money or other
property in settlement of a suit, sometimes faces an adversary more
formidable than the just vanquished, for the federal tax col-
lector may insist on sharing with him the fruits of victory. As for
the losing litigant, there are times when his loss, after taxes, may
be substantially less than the full amount which must be or has been
paid in satisfaction of a judgment or in settlement of a suit. The
tax opportunities of the losing litigant will be considered later,
in Part II.
PART I-FAVORABLE JUDGMENTS
As will be shown in more detail as we go along, a successful
litigant may urge that his recovery: (a) is not comprehended within
the broad concept of taxable income; (b) irrespective of possible
inclusion within the statutory purview of gross income, the judg-
ment is excluded from taxation by certain provisions of the code;
or (c) the recovery is entitled to one of the various types of rela-
tively preferential treatment specified in the present or the prior
code, which ever is applicable under the circumstances.
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which is co-
extensive with corresponding provisions of prior statutes, sweeps
"all income from whatever source derived" within the taxable
ambit of gross income. There are statutory illustrations of various
kinds of taxable income, but no statutory definition which may be
used as a criterion or test for determining whether an apparent
increase of wealth is real, is recognizable and is income. The opin-
7 See Commissioner v. Glenshow Glass Co., 348 U, S. 426, 431 (1955).
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ions of courts are similarly devoid of any authoritative definition
which may be used as "a touchstone to all future gross income
questions."'
As indicated above, there are certain specific statutory ex-
clusions from gross income. For example, section 102(a) of the
present code provides, as did the corresponding section of the prior
code, that "Gross income does not include the value of property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." Section 104(a)
contains the following additional provisions which are pertinent
here:
(a) In General.-Except in the case of amounts attrib-
utable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under
section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any
prior taxable year, gross income does not include-
(1) amounts received under workmen's compensa-
tion acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness;
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether






Bequest or inheritance. In the leading case of Lyeth v. Hoey,8
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a sum which
a son of a deceased daughter of a decedent received in compro-
mise of litigation attacking the validity of a will of the latter was
protected from the grasp of the collector by the provision ex-
cluding the taxation of the value of property acquired by inherit-
ance. The will had been drawn so as to benefit a charity at the
expense of the taxpayer. The Court pointed out that the tax-
payer's heirship underlay the compromise agreement. In a much
more recent case, the Tax Court denied the protection of the statu-
tory provision to a taxpayer who was unrelated to the decedent
but who had received money in settlement of litigation based on
the decedent's alleged contract to provide for the taxpayer, an em-
ployee, by will."
Workmen's compensation. In William L. Neill ° the taxpayer
had not received what ordinarily would be considered a workmen's
compensation award or judgment. The Tax Court, though doubting
that the provisions relating to workmen's compensation "are liter-
ally applicable," gave the benefit of provisions comparable to
those above quoted from section 104 to a policeman retired for
disability incurred in line of duty. An earlier decision by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia 1 insisted on a more lite.-al
8 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
, John Davies, 23 T. C. 524 (1954),
o 17 T. C. 1015 (1951).
"Waller v. United States, 180 F.2d 194 (D. C. Cir. 1950).
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application of the statutory language in question and a quite re-
cent pronouncement of the Tax Court 12 seems to look more favor-
ably on the restrictive decision of the Court of Appeals than on
the Tax Court's own more liberal holding in the Neill case.
Personal injuries. The precise scope of the exclusion of recov-
eries received "on account of personal injuries" has not been spelled
out in litigation or otherwise to the extent that might be expected.
This may be the result of two factors: (a) In the past, perhaps
more than will be true in the future, reliance has been placed on
the limitations of, or implied exclusions from, the statutory income
concept; and (b) revenue officials may have been reluctant to test
out every conceivable legal possibility of revenue at the expense
of an injured class whose net recoveries seldom are considered by
its members as full compensatory however impressive gross recov-
eries may seem to others.
In Joseph Frank": the Tax Court found that the taxpayer had
failed to establish that part of his recovery was based on an assault
and on that ground the court denied him the benefit of the ex-
press statutory exclusion for personal injuries. An early decision by
the Board of Tax Appeals, now the Tax Court, held that damages
for libelling the taxpayer personally (not in his professional capac-
ity) were not within the statutory income concept. 14 A recent ad-
ministrative ruling placed the non-taxability of recoveries for
wrongful death on the same basis." It would seem that the latter
ruling at least could have been rested on the provisions of the
express exclusion of damages received on account of personal in-
juries. There is authoritative precedent from the field of general
law for applying the evident policy and not merely the literal and
express terms of a statute.16 As we learn still elsewhere, "the letter
killeth, but the spirit giveth life."
The interest on a personal injury judgment appears includible
in gross income on the basis of an early decision. 7 Damages related
to impaired earning capacity, past as well as future, may be entitled
to the benift of the exclusion of items received "on account of per-
sonal injuries." Despite what is said in a moment about the ab-
sence of any implied exclusion of punitive damages, exemplary
damages awarded in a personal injury case may be held within the
exclusion from gross income expressed in section 104(a)(2) and its
predecessors.
Punitive damages. In March 1955 the Supreme Court of the
United States handed down a decision in the case of Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co. 8 In that case the Supreme Court held that
treble or punitive damages awarded in federal antitrust litigation
were within the concept of income subjected to tax by section
22(a), the equivalent of the present section 61. In effect, the Court
Charles F. Brown, 25 T. C. 220 (1955)
5822 T. C. 945 (1954), off'd per curiam, 226 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1955). Whether income taxes should
be taken into account in fixing damages for personal injuries is, of course, o quite different ques-
tion. Cf. Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2nd Cir. 1944) (no error in refusing to make a deduc-
tion for income taxes).
14 C. A. Hawkins, 6 B. T. A. 1023 (1927).
'5 Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 179.
16 E. g., Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U. S. 381 (1939).
5' Theodate Pope Riddle, 27 B. T. A. 1339 (1933).
348 U. S. 426. (1955).
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held that the punitive damages constituted gross income and were
not the beneficiaries of any implied exclusion from gross income.
The Court pointed out that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
had published his non-acquiescence in a contrary decision which
the Board of Tax Appeals had made in 1940 and consistently there-
after had asserted the taxability of such receipts.
Insider profits. On the same day that the Supreme Court de-
cided the Glenshaw Glass case, the Court also ruled taxable the
"insider profits" recovered by a corporation from a director who
had dealt in the securities of the corporation.1 9 With respect to
such profits the Court said, "There is no indication that Congress
intended to exempt them from coverage.
20
Whether income or recovery of capital. It is the clear import
of the two Supreme Court decisions just mentioned that all "gains"
are includible in gross income unless specifically excluded. This
still leaves open and at large the basic, bedrock question whether
a given recovery is a "gain" or "income" or, on the contrary, is a
recovery of capital. The answer to that question, as will be seen,
may depend in considerable measure on what relief counsel has
asked for in his pleading, the language of the agreement in com-
promise, and the proof presented on the respective trials. It may
not be surprising, in view of the above-mentioned confusion in
which the law of damages is enveloped, that the decision of this
tax issue seldom has been made to turn on the nature of damages
as a matter of stautuory or common law. In a recent case, however,
in which a portion of a recovery in a partnership accounting was
held capital, this factor was recognized as a favorable one to the tax-
payer under the circumstances.2'
(a) Recovery of capital. In Durkee v. Commissioner"2 the
appellate court was asked to decide the taxability of a sum which
the taxpayer, an electrical contractor, received in settlement of
a tort action which charged the defendants with combining to
injure the taxpayer's business. The court indicated its opinion
that a portion of the settlement represented a recovery of a capi-
tal item, goodwill, and it remanded the case to the Tax Court for a
" General American Investors Co. v. Commissioners, 348 U.S. 434 (1955). See also Commission-
ers v. Lo Bue, 351 U. S. 243 (1956) (holding certain options to purchase stock to be income).
M General American Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 434.
21 Specialty Engineering Co., 12 T. C. 1173 (1949). See Uniform Partnership Act § 42.
m 162 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1947). See also Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912
(6th Cir. 1932).
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determination, among other things, of the unrecovered basis of
the asset in question. The court was impressed by the fact that
the taxpayer had made no claim for lost profits as such and had
merely measured the damage to his goodwill by loss of income . 2
In Commissioner v. PenToad Corp.24 the taxpayer's recovery
of a large sum on trust principles, as a result of a stockholders'
derivative suit, was held to represent capital instead of income.
The suit which was settled had alleged a breach of trust in that in-
vestments of the taxpayer had been made for the benefit of an-
other corporation rather than for the advantage of the taxpayer.
Both the Tax Court and the appellate court agreed that the sums
recovered stood in place of losses or impairments of capital which
had been caused by the improper investment.
25
(b) Recovery held income. In a recent case the Tax Court
overruled the taxpayer's contention that sums received in settle-
ment of an antitrust suit represented capital in part..2 6 The com-
plaint in the suit appeared to demand damages for lost profits
rather than damages for injury to business in general and good-
will in particular. In Mathey v. Commissioner27 the appellate court
" As for a tort resulting in the physical destruction of specific assets and another tort involving
the impairment of property value, see and compare the two cases cited in footnotes 33 and 34 infro.
Further, note the textual discussion to which the two footnotes pertain.
228 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1955).
See also Ollie Beverly Rose, 8 T. C. 854 (1947).
se Chalmers Cullins, 24 T. C. 322 (1955).
27 177 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1949), cert. denied, :i39 U. S. 943 (1950). See Avery Corp. v. Fugate, 129
Colo. 595, 272 P.2d 652 (1954) [state income case discussing a judgment rendered in Hyman & Co.
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held taxable a damage recovery in a patent infringement suit. In
doing so the court stated the rule applicable as follows:
If it was brought to recover lost profits, the proceeds are
taxable as income; if it was brought to recover for loss or
damage to capital, the proceeds are non-taxable.
28
In the early, leading case of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,29
the Supreme Court held includible in gross income a taxpayer's
recovery on a dredging contract for breach of warranty of the ma-
terials to be dredged. It was held that the damages did not consti-
tute capital even though, in a sense, they did no more than restore
to the taxpayer a portion of the expenditures made in earlier years
in partial performance of the unprofitable contract. The tax-
payer was reporting income on a yearly rather than on a completed
contract basis.. (c) Burden of proof. In a number of cases taxpayers have been
denied the desired treatment of an item as capital in whole or in
part because of a failure to establish to the satisfaction of the
court that all or a definite part or proportion of a sum received
as damages or in settlement was allocable to capital items, such
as goodwill, rather than to profits. Possibly no other factor has
been cited as often by the courts in recent years as a basis for
treating the disputed item as income. 0 At least as early as the
launching of the action for tort, breach of contract, breach of trust
or whatever, the taxpayer should consider the ways and means of
obtaining the maximum recovery after taxes. At the beginning
of the litigation is the time to lay the groundwork which will en-
able proper proof to be made in any later tax dispute. Moreover,
the basis of the assets alleged to have been damaged should be con-
sidered at the outset and later stages of the litigation.
Whether ordinary income or capital gain. By a statutory defini-
tion of general application a capital gain is one which arises from
the sale or exchange of a capital asset.3 Sometimes the facts are
such that an "involuntary conversion" may be relied on in lieu
of fulfilling the statutory prerequisite by the more common means
' But see note 1 supra at 181. Cf. Kane, Patent Low, 1954 Ann. Survey Am. L. 420, 422.
Z 282 U. S. 359 (1931). See Sanders v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1955), cert.* denied,
350 U. S. 967 (1956) (concerning tax character of money received in settlement of claims under con-
struction contract).
*Cf. Phoenix Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1956) (failure of proof-com-
plaint not controlling); Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.) (basis not
shown), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 779 (1944); H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1937); Chalmers Cullins, 24 T. C. 322 (1955).
8u Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222.
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of a sale or exchange.12 Thus in Walter A. Henshaw33 a judgment
attibutable to the negligent destruction of oil and gas in place
was held to involve an "involuntary conversion" of the asset. Since
the taxpayer had no unrecovered basis in the destroyed assets, he
was taxable on the entire judgment but, under the circumstances, at
the favorable rate applicable to a long-term capital gain. Damages
awarded for slander of title appear to stand on a different footing.
34
They represent capital recoveries, but in the ordinary case at least
would not be deemed to include gains, capital or otherwise.3
5
The case of Sarah A. Young "- involved a special type of sale
or exchange, that of stock surrendered to a corporation in return
for corporate assets distributed in liquidation. Actually, the tax-
payer had recovered a judgment in a stockholder's derivative suit.
but, as the corporation had been liquidated, the judgment inured to
the benefit of the taxpayer. The Tax Court held the judgment
should be treated as so much received on liquidation of the cor-
poration and be taxed accordingly. There being no unrecovered
basis in the stock, the taxpayer in this case was taxable on the
entirety of the judgment but as a capital gain, not ordinary in-
come.
In several instances it has been held that a settlement of a
seller's suit to rescind a sale of stock is tantamount to a sale of
stock for tax purposes and that the sum received is subject to treat-
ment as part of the purchase price 7 A purchaser who sued for
specific performance of the contract to sell but received cash in set-
tlement of the suit was held to have made a sale or exchange of
rights in a capital asset with the result that, like the sellers just
mentioned, he was able to shield his receipt from treatment as
ordinary income. 38 It is noteworthy, however, that in the latter case
the taxpayer's right to purchase did not arise from an employment
contract and did not constitute partial compensation for services
performed.39 In a case of the kind just mentioned, as in the case of
a judgment on a note given for services, the receipt would be
ordinary income.
4 0
Whether judgment may be attributed to several years. In sev-
eral recent cases taxpayers have sought to obtain for their settle-
ments or judgments the benefit of the provisions permitting the
attribution of income to several years. In one case the Tax Court
turned down a claim that a sum received in settlement of a suit
for breach of an employment contract deserved treatment as
"back pay" under a predecessor of section 1303.' 1 In another case
the same court held the income item did not relate to services
Id. § 1231.
23 T.C. 176 (1954).
Highlands Forms Corp., 42 B. T. A. 1314 (1940).
'See note 23 supra together with the pertinent text regarding recovery of capitol, and see
note 44 infra with the related text concerning the usual necessity of a sale or exchange as a pre-
requisite to capital gain treatment.
16 T. C. 1424 (1951).
31 Albert J. Goldsmith, 22 T. C. 1137 (1954) (overruled Government argument that "severance
pay" was involved); Margery K. Megargel, 3 T. C. 238 (1944). But see Frank T. Feagans, 23 T. C. 208
(1954) (no sole of capital asset, but, rather, a collection of compensation).
msQuincy A. Shaw McKeon, 6 T. C. 757 (1946).
sCf. Albert C. Becken, Jr., 5 T.C. 498 (1945).
40 Matilda S. Puelicher, 6 T. C. 300 (1946).
'1 Estate of Lester 0. Stearns, 14 T. C. 420 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 189 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1951).
DICTA
May-June, 1957
performed, as required by the provisions invoked, presenting
section 1301.42
Realization of gain deferred - condemnation - reorganization.
The present code, like the one which preceded it, contains provisions
spicificallly directed to condemnation and threats or imminence
of it. The purpose of the provisions is to permit any gain resulting
from the seizure or sale of property in such circumstances to be
deferred, or, perhaps, depending on later events, avoided alto-
gether.4 3 In a different type of case a taxpayer succeeded in having
a gain on the surrender of judgment claims held a "non-taxable
transfer" (i.e., the realization of gain deferred). 4 He had surren-
dered the claims to the debtor in consideration of the issuance
to him of stock of the debtor, a transaction which gave the taxpayer
and other judgment creditors control of the corporate debtor with-
in the meaning of section 112(b)(5), a section of the old law relat-
ing to non-taxable reorganizations.
Judgment collected by assignee -deferred collection -"tax-
benefit" rule. A purchaser of a judgment who collects upon it is not
deemed to have made a sale or exchange of the judgment.45 Any
gains on such transactions, therefore, are taxable as ordinary in-
come. In the well-known Dobson case,43 the Supreme Court held
that the Board of Tax Appeals had committed no error of law in
42 Curtis B. Doll, 23 T. C. 580 (1954), off'd per curiam, 228 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1955).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1033. For examples of the application of the "involunotry conversion"
section of the prior law, see Gaynor News Co., 22 T. C. 1172 (1954); Leon Strauss, 22 T. C. 140
(1954); Rev. Rul. 55-170, 1955-1 Cum Bull. 342.
"Alexander E. Duncon, 9 T. C. 468 (1947). Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 351, with Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 112 (b) (5).
45 Galvin Hudson, 20 T. C. 734 (1953), off'd per curiam sub nom. Ogilvie v. Commissioner, 216
F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1954).
46Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943).
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applying the "tax benefit" rule-a rule which is now embodied
in section 111 of the code.
According to the decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals in the
Dobson and other cases a judgment or cash settlement obtained by
a purchaser of stock on the basis of fraud perpetrated by the seller
of the stock is required to treat the receipt as ordinary income if
in a prior, closed year the stock was sold, a loss taken and a tax
benefit received. The receipt is income only to the extent of the tax
benefit or deduction derived from the loss taken in the closed year.
If no benefit were obtained from any such deduction, the subse-
quent recovery of judgment for fraud in the sale transaction would
include no income. There are evident distinctions between the
Dobson case and the McKean case 47 discussed above, but new cases
may arise in which it will be difficult to determine which or
what rule should govern.
Interest. The includibility in gross income of interest on a per-
sonal-injury judgment already has been mentioned. 48 In several
instances, too, the portion of a judgment labelled interest has been
recognized as includable in gross income.
4 9
PART II-ADVERSE JUDGMENTS
A litigant who has suffered an adverse judgment or made a pay-
ment in settlement of a suit does not ipso facto become entitled to
an income tax deduction. Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
as under prior law, certain liabilities and payments are deductible
and others are not; some items are deductible from gross income
without reservation and others are deductible to a limited extent
only.
Business expense. One of the best known deductions is that of
business expenses. Section 162(a) of the present code provides that
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business" are deductible.
It seems abundantly clear that a bus company should be per-
mitted to deduct the amount paid in satisfaction of a judgment for
personal injuries which were caused by the company in the course
of its business. The Tax Court has so held. 50 However, in the case
of an individual who paid a sum in settlement of a judgment ob-
tained against him because of an automobile accident, the same
court denied a deduction of the sum paid as a business expense
since it appeared the vehicle was being used at the time of the col-
lision on the business of the taxpayer's employer. 5' Had the accident
occurred during a trip made in the course of the individual tax-
payer's own business, the holding doubtless would have been
otherwise.52
47 See note 38 supra.
48 See notes 14 and 17 supra, and related text. But see Helvering v. Drier, 72 F.2d 75 (D. C. Cir.
1934) ("interest" plus payment by Mixed Claims Comm. did not 'equal basis of property taken).
"Kieselbach v. Commissioner, 317 U. S. 399 (1943) (interest on condemnation award); W. H.
Kiser, 12 T. C. 178 (1949) (held no interest included in partition decree); Ollie Beverly Rose, 8 T. C.
854 (1947).
mo Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., 16 T. C. 557 (1951).
51 Emanuel 0. Diamond, 19 T. C. 737 (1953).
2Anderson v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1936).
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In the recent case of Mid-State Products Co. 3 the corporate
taxpayer was denied the deduction of a sum paid by it in settle-
ment of a suit in which the corporation and its president were co-
defendants. The suit, brought by a stockholder, had charged the
president with mismanagement and "milking" of the corporation.
Under the settlement, the president acquired the shares of the
complaining stockholder. Accordingly, the court took the position
that the taxpayer's payment was not made for corporate pur-
poses or "in carrying on any trade or business" of the taxpayer.
In another proceeding in which the corporate stake in a controversy
involving the officer was shown to be greater, a different result was
reached. 14
A trustee who personally paid a sum of money in settlement
of an action brought against a trust employee who had made a
fatal attack on a third person was not permitted to deduct his
payment either as a business expense or as a loss." The payment
was held not to be a business expense of the taxpayers person-
ally. In the absence of a showing that reimbursement from the
trust was impossible or impractical, the court was unwilling to
allow the sum paid to be deducted as a loss.
In Hales-Mullaly v. Commissioner,;5 a corporate taxpayer paid
out a considerable sum in settlement of a suit in which it was
joined as a co-defendant with its organizers and promoters and
a number of its employees. The suit charged fraud and a con-
spiracy to pirate the business of the camplainant-competitor. In ad-
dition to relying on the position that the payment did not relate
to carrying on the taxpayer's business, the court of appeals said
of the expenditure, "It is not ordinary."" The corporation's own
liability, if any, was extraordinary, according to the court, in that
it depended on the exceptional factor of the corporation's reten-
tion of the fruits of the fraud of others, to-wit, its organizers. In
passing on the same facts and a similar question concerning state
income taxes, the Oklahoma Supreme Court came to a contrary
conclusion."
That an adverse judgment in private litigation is based on
fraud has been held insufficient, per se, to make the payment an
extraordinary expense. 9 Indeed, not all penalties for public wrong-
"21 T. C. 696 (1954).
"Catholic News Publishing Co., 10 T. C. 73 (1948).
mCharles D. Whitney, 13 T. C. 897 (1949).
w 131 F.2d 509 (10th Cir. 1942).
57 Id. at 512.
68 Protest of Hales-Mullaly, Inc., 186 Okla. 693, 100 P.2d 274 (1940).
50 Helvering v. Hampton, 99 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1935).
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doing are denied deductibility. In 1954, the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue finally agreed with the courts, or came close to agree-
ing with them, when he ruled that penalties for violations of OPA
regulations are deductible if the violations were neither intentional
"nor the result of the failure to take practical precautions. "10
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the words "more or less legal"
have been interpolated into the above-quoted provisions of section
162 (a) at some point by those who administer and apply that sec-
tionY' For example, a payment made by a cement company in settle-
ment of a non-civil antitrust proceeding brought against it by the
State of Texas was held non-deductible as a business expense in
Universal Atlas Cement Co.,6 2 despite that taxpayer's denial of guilt
in connection with the settlement. So also was a deduction denied
in William F. Davis, Jr.63 with respect to "insiders profits" paid to a
corporation. Though a number of its members dissented in the Davis
case, the Tax Court held that a deduction of such a payment,
whether as a business expense or a loss, would frustrate a well-
defined national policy.
In another case which involved "insiders profits" the taxpayer's
obligation to disgorge was less clear but a payment was made in
' Rev. Rul. 54-204, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 49. But cf. Julain Lentin, 23 T. C. 112 (1954), off'd, 226
F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 934 (1956) (penalties for willful OPA violations held
non-deductible). See generally Annot., 20 A. L. R. 2d 600 (1951).
61 But cf. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467 (1943); Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635
(7th Cir. 1956).
659 T. C. 971 (1947). off'd per curiom, 171 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied. 336 U. S. 962.
(1949).
0 17 T. C. 549 (1951).
DEFENDERS OF HEALTH AND COMFORT
PLUMBING, HEATING AND
COOLING CONTRACTORS
These seals are your guarantee of quality work by reliable
plumbing, heating and cooling contractors. Look for them in
the yellow pages of your phone book.
MYRON McGINLEY, Administrator
PIPE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT FUND
DICTA
May-June, 1957
settlement of the possible liability. In this case, the Tax Court
was willing to allow a deduction of the payment either as an ex-
pense or a loss.6 4 In Commissioner v. Macy," the beneficiaries of
certain testamentary trusts filed objections to the accounts which
the taxpayers, as trustees, had presented for judicial approval.
There was no charge of bad faith. Without admitting liability but in
order to settle the contested matters, the taxpayers consented to
a surcharge of their accounts and placed personal funds, in an
amount equal to the surcharge, to the credit of the principal ac-
counts of the trust estates. The payment was held deductible as
a business expense both by the Tax Court and on appeal.
Capital expenditure.16 In the last of the foregoing cases one of
the rejected arguments of the Commissioner was that the pay-
ment credited to the principal of the respective trusts was a capital
expenditure and thus not deductible. In another recent case the Tax
Court overruled a government contention that a payment made
in settlement of a suit for commissions, damages for breach of con-
tract, and similar items, actually represented the purchase price of
an interest in a patent.67
The Commissioner is more likely to favor the position that a
84 William L. Butler, 17 T. C. 675 (1951).
05215 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1954). Accord Great Island Holding Corp., 5 T. C. 150 (1945).
06What constitutes a capital expenditure, like what constitutes a capital recovery, a question
discussed in Part I, pertains to the whole income tax system, the entire code rather thcn any par-
ticular section. This is tantamount to saying that the distinction between income and capital and
between capital expenditure and revenue charges entails recourse to what may be called
"the common law of taxes."
07 Camloc Fastener Co., 10 T. C. 1024 (1948).
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payment is a capital expenditure than is the taxpayer. Such was
the situation in the cases just mentioned. 8 However, in James E.
Caldwell & Co.6 9 it was the petitioner which wanted to have one of
its payments so classified. The payment in question had been made
in settlement of a suit which had been brought against the taxpayer
by a judgment-creditor of its president for the purpose of setting
aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance. The Tax Court held, with
several members of the court dissenting, that the taxpayer could
not add the payment to the basis of the property for the purpose of
computing a gain on the sale of the property.
Non-business expense. In Samuel G. Swaim"t a taxpayer had
paid part of a commission claimed by a real estate broker, but had
done so without admitting liability, merely to avoid litigation. The
Tax Court held that the sum so paid was spent to conserve property
and so was deductible as a non-business expense. The language of
the governing section of the current code, section 212, corresponds
with that of the prior law except that it has been broadened to pro-
vide expressly for the deduction of certain expenses relating to
taxes. Section 212 provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary.expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or main-
tenance of property held for the production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection
or refund of any tax.
7 1
In a case in which the facts were essentially similar to those in
the Macy case discussed above, the taxpayer claimed a deduction
as a non-business expense. The Tax Court's decision granting the
deduction was reversed on appeal by the same appellate court
which later considered the Macy case.72 In the latter case the court
of appeals did not overrule its prior decision expressly, it at all,
but distinguished the two cases on the basis of the section of law
invoked by the respective taxpayers. However, it would seem more
reasonable, in the ordinary case of a non-professional trustee (as all
these appear to have been), to grant such a deduction as a non-
business expense and to disallow it, if at all, as a business expense.
A taxpayer who purchased a release of a claim made against
him under the warranty provisions of a deed was denied the right
to deduct the payment either as an ordinary loss or as a non-business
expense.73 The Tax Court held the payment was deductible only
in the limited way prescribed for capital losses. The transaction of
sale and conveyance which had occurred a few years earlier than
0 See also Levitt & Sons, 5 T. C. 913 (1945), aff'd per curia-, 160 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1947).
24 T. C. 597 (1955).
-020 T. C. 1022 (1953).
71 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 212.
7 Julius A. Heide, 8 T. C. 314 (1947), rev'd, 165 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1948). For discussion of the
general relation between business and non-business expense, see Bingham Trust v. Commissioner,
325 U. 5. 365 (1945).
( Estate of James M. Shannonhouse, 21 T. C. 422 (1953). But cf. Samuel G. Swain, 20 T. C. 1022
(1953).SiiCHS-LIIWLOR- CORPORAiTIONi SEALS- ALtPinE 5-23422
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the payment aforesaid was capital in nature and, according to the
holding of the court, imparted its character as such to the adjust-
ment made under the warranty contained in the deed.
Capital loss. In the case just described the court relied on the
holding of the Supreme- Court in the Arrowsmith case.14 In the
latter case, the taxpayer had paid a judgment given against a
liquidated corporation of which he was a transferee. Several years
earlier, at the time of the liquidation and in connection with it, the
taxpayer had reported a capital gain and had paid the tax for the
year accordingly. The Tax Court had considered the payment of
the judgment as a fully deductible ordinary loss. The Supreme
Court differed. In a decision from which three justices dissented
the Supreme Court held that the loss fell squarely within the defi-
nition of "capital losses" contained in the sections pertaining to such
losses-the necessary sale or exchange presumably being the one
which had occurred for tax purposes at the time of the liquidation.
This view of the situation meant a much smaller deduction for the
taxpayer than would have been allowed under the ruling of the
Tax Court.
Some years before, the Supreme Court had held that a capital
loss occurred when a vendee's interest in real estate constituting a
capital asset was cut off by a foreclosure saleT5 According to the
Court, the sale on foreclosure, though involuntary, was a sale
within the meaning of the capital-loss provisions then in force.
Moreover, the sale rather than the decree on foreclosure was held
to be the definitive event establishing the loss. The principle of
the case doubtless is broad enough to cover the ordinary foreclosure
of mortgagors' interests in capital assets.
Ordinary loss. In many instances a losing litigant or other tax-
payer seeking to deduct a judgment or other payment makes the
alternative claim that it is either an expense or an ordinary loss.
Whenever either type of deduction is allowable at all, it is allow-
able in full, but, as would be expected, the respective sections differ
in language and to some extent in coverage. The text of section 165
of the current code resembles that of prior provisions and, so far
as here pertinent, reads as follows':
14Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U. S. 6 (1952). For current capital loss provisions see Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 1211-12 & 1222.
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In the case of an individual, the deduction under section
(a) shall be limited to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into
for profit, though not connected with a trade or business;
and
(3) losses of property not connected with a trade
or business, if such losses arise from fire, storm, ship-
wreck, or other casualty, or from theft.7 6
While there is no express statutory limitation on the losses de-
ductible by corporations, certain limitations have been implied.
For a reason not explained in the court's opinion, the facts of the
Hales-Mullaly case discussed above did not justify an ordinary loss
deduction. It may be, as a subsequent Tax Court decision implies,
that an essential condition for deducting a corporate loss resulting
from a settlement is an approved degree of relationship between
the corporate business and the loss.7 Moreover, as in the case of an
expense, an ordinary loss deduction appears subject to the implied
condition that it is not generally allowable, either to an individual or
to a corporation, with respect to an adjudged fine, penalty or the
like.7"
At times, as indicated earlier, an ordinary loss deduction may
be denied on the ground that the loss in question is more appro-




The foregoing, of course, is no more than introduction to certain
common phases of the law of federal income taxes. It is hoped,
however, that the elementary nature of the study will be one of its
chief merits. To suggest solutions for all likely situations, even if
possible, would be to place the cart before the horse. In tax law as
elsewhere, the solution of a specific problem depends upon its rec-
ognition and that in turn is conditioned upon an understanding of
the general nature of the various types of problems which have
been, and thus may be, encountered in litigation. If the present ar-
ticle contributes to such an understanding-to such a recognition of
problems and possibilities-it has served its purpose. Particular
solutions, like heaven, can wait. Besides, something should be
left to litigation!
' nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165.
SJames E. Caldwell & Co., 24 T. C. 597 (1955) (2d question presented).
'5 See notes 60, 61, 62 and 63 supro, and related text. Cf. United States v. Algemene Kuntzijde
Unie, N. V., 226 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1955) deduction of loss denied as contrary to national policy);
Fuller v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954) (loss deduction denied because of state policy).
-- It should be noted, too, that the ordinary loss and bad debt provisions are mutually exclusive.
Spring City Foundry C. v. Commissioner, 292 U. S. 182 (1934). A non-business bad debt results in a
capital loss. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166 (d). Cf. Thomas Lonergan Trust, 6 T. C. 715 (1946) (un-
usual question whether payment of a judgment against a decedent was deductible by the trustee as
currently distributable income reportable by the beneficiary under the provisions relating to trusts;
deduction disallowed).
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SECONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS OF SECURITIES
By LELAND E. MODESITT
Leland E. Modesitt received his B.S.
and LL.B. degrees from the Univer-
sity of Colorado. He is a member of
the Colorado, Denver, and Ameri-
can Bar Associations and has writ-
ten several previous articles on se-
curities law.
The emphasis which has been placed upon the qualification
of public offerings of securities by issuing corporations, known
as primary distributions, has tended to obscure the problems which
arise after the completion of such offerings. A large part of what
has been said and written to explain the "latent ambiguities" of
federal and state securities laws deals with the obligations of an
issuer in quest of public financing. The insider in quest of public
financing stays backstage, well beyond the footlights where he may,
if he is so inclined, unobtrusively change the scenery.
Generally speaking, a secondary distribution is a distribution
by persons other than the issuer of securities. A distribution, as
the name implies, involves indiscriminate sales of a substantial
amount of securities and not a few sporadic, restricted transactions.
Thus, offerings by large stockbrokers such as promoters, officers,
directors, trusts and insurance companies usually constitute sec-
ondary distributions.
It is a common practice to issue substantial amounts of stock
to promoters in exchange for properties and services, prior to the
solicitation of the public for required corporate financing. When
the primary offering is made by the corporation the prospectus or
offering circular discloses the nature of the properties and business
and how much promotional stock there is in relation to the shares
sold for cash. Hence, the buyer is in a position to consider how
much "water" there is, and whether the issue is relatively attrac-
tive at the stated offering price.
The promoters, officers and directors generally hold their
shares until the corporation's public financing has been completed.
At least they are fairly discreet about any sales made during this
period. Although this is required by law where the primary offer-
ing has been made pursuant to Regulation A,1 there is a sound
1 17 C. F. R. § 230. 251-62 (Supp. 1957).
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business reason in that concurrent sales by insiders would under-
mine the primary distribution of the issuer. After the primary
offering has been completed and a market for the shares so dis-
tributed has been established, most insiders can never be com-
pletely indifferent to the market situation. The amount, and the
time when they sell varies according to individual conceptions of
legal restrictions, the inherent value and growth potential of the
shares, the desire for immediate cash funds and various other fac-
tors, but sooner or later these promotional shares reach the mar-
ket.
The provisions of the Securities Act of 19332 with respect to the
sale of securities by an issuing corporation are reasonably explicit;
but, considering that some control of sales by affiliates is equally
in the public interest, the statutory provisions applicable to such
transactions ale remarkably devious. These provisions are:
Sec. 4. [Exempted Transactions] (1) "Transactions by
any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer;
transactions by an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing; or transactions by a dealer (including an underwriter
no longer acting as an underwriter in respect of the se-
curity involved in such transaction), except transactions
taking place prior to the expiration of forty days after the
first date upon which the security was bona fide offered
to the public by, the issuer or by or through an underwriter
and transactions in a security as to which a registration
statement has been filed taking place prior to the expira-
tion of forty days after the first effective date of such
registration statement or prior to the expiration of forty
days after the first date upon which the security was bona
fide offered to the public by the. issuer or by or through
an underwriter after such effective date, whichever is later
(excluding in the computation of such forty days any time
during which a stop order issued under section 8 is in
effect as to the security), and except transactions as to se-
curities constituting the whole or part of an unsold allot-
ment to or subscription by such dealer as a participant
in the distribution of such securities by the issuer or by
or through the underwriter."
'48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. § 77 (a) to (o) (1952).
WHITEHEAD, VOGL AND LOWE
Specialists in
PATENT, TRADE MARK AND
COPYRIGHT PRACTICE
Suite 709 Kittredge Building Phone MAin 3-4138
DICTA
May-June, 1957
(2) "Brokers' transactions, executed upon customers'
orders on any exchange or in the open or counter market,
but not the solicitation of such orders."
Sec. 2 (4) "The term 'issuer' means every person who
issues or proposes to issue any security; except that with
respect to certificates of deposit, voting-trust certificates, or
collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates
of interest or shares in an unincorporated investment trust
not having a board of directors (or persons performing sim-
ilar functions) or of the fixed, restricted management, or
unit type, the term 'issuer' means the person or persons
performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or
manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or other
agreement or instrument under which such securities are
issued; except that in the case of an unincorporated associa-
tion which provides by its articles for limited liability of
any or all of its members, or in the case of a trust, commit-
tee, or other legal entity, the trustees or members thereof
shall not be individually liable as issuers of any security
issued by the association, trust, committee, or other legal
entity; except that with respect to equipment-trust certifi-
cates or like securities, the term 'issuer' means the person
by whom the equipment or property is or is to be used
and except that with respect to fractional undivided inter-
ests in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, the term 'issuer'
means the owner of any such right or of any interest in
such right (whether whole or fractional) who creates frac-
tional interests therein for the purpose of public offering."
Sec. 2 (11) "The term 'underwriter' means any person
who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers
or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of
any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect par-
ticipation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any
such undertaking; but such term shall not include a person
whose interest is limited to a commission from an under-
writer or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary
distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this para-
graph the term 'issuer' shall include, in addition to an is-
suer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or con-
trolled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect





As in the case of many problems arising under this federal law,
it is impossible to weave the statutory provisions into a categorical
rule governing all sales by insiders. A number of factors remain un-
defined. What constitutes "distribution," "direct or indirect partici-
pation" or "direct or indirect common control" under section 2 (11)?
Does section 4 (2) mean what it says, and if so, what constitutes an
unsolicited order?
In the Matter of Thompson Ross Securities Co.,' it was held that
the president of a corporation who owned 18% of the outstanding
stock and who had managed and formulated policies for the cor-
poration for over ten years was a controlling person, and a dealer
purchasing from him was held to be an underwriter under section
2 (11). In discussing the question of control the Commission stated:
"The question of 'control' is a factual question. 'Con-
trol' is not synonymous with ownership of 51% of the vot-
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ing stock of a corporation. Where power exists to direct the
management and policies of a corporation, 'control' within
the meaning of Sec. 2 (11) exists even though the persons
who possess that power do not own a majority of the cor-
poration's voting stock."
Possibly the most controversial case involving a number of the
problems of secondary distributions was In the Matter of Ira Haupt
and Co.0 From December 15, 1943 to June 1, 1944 Ira Haupt and Co.,
a New York Stock Exchange firm, sold approximately 93,000 shares
of the common stock of Park and Tilford Inc., on behalf of
the Schulte interests, who together owned some 91% of the out-
standing stock. On December 15, 1943, when the market price of the
stock was about $57, Schulte publicly announced that Park and Til-
ford, Inc., was considering a distribution of whiskey to its share-
holders at cost. Following the announcement the price steadily ad-
vanced to a high of 981/4 on May 26, 1944. On that day Park and Til-
ford, Inc., offered to sell to its stockholders at a reduced price six
cases of whiskey for each share of stock. On May 31, 1944, the Office
of Price Administration limited the negotiability of the purchase
rights and the maximum profits on resale of the liquor. The price
of the stock dropped 10V8 points that day and reached a low of 30%
in June. During this period the Haupt firm transacted all sales for
Schulte over the New York Stock Exchange. The sell orders com-
menced with 200 or 300 share blocks but within three months the
firm was authorized to sell up to 50,000 shares at 80 or better. It
was stipulated that during the period of five and a half months
when the 93,000 shares were sold, approximately 89,000 had been
sold without any solicitation.
In an administrative proceeding against the Haupt firm it was
argued that the transactions were exempt as broker's transactions
under section 4 (2). One of the principal contentions of Haupt was
that a precise number of shares to be publicly dispersed is an essen-
tial element of a distribution.
The Commission had no trouble tying the Haupt firm into the
violation. It stated: "Nor do we think that a distribution loses its
character as such merely because the extent of the offering may
depend upon certain conditions such as market price."' The Com-
Id. at 1119. See also S. E. C. v. Kaye Real & Co., 122 F. Supp. 639 (S. D. N. Y. 1954).
023S E C. 589 (1946).
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mission also rejected the firm's claim that it was not aware of the
distribution intended by the Schulte interests. The Commission
pointed out that only 7,000 shares of the stock had been traded on
the exchange in the entire month of November; that 24,500 shares
had been traded in the first two days following the announcement
of the impending whiskey dividend; and that an additional 115,000
shares had been traded during the rest of that month. Under all
the circumstances the Commission found that the only reasonable
conclusion that could have been reached was that it was intended
that a large block would be sold.
Haupt also contended that substantially all sales were un-
solicited transactions within the section 4 (2) exemption, but the
Commission stated:
"We conclude that Section 4 (2) cannot exempt trans-
actions by an underwriter executed over the Exchange in
connection with a distribution for a controlling stockholder.
Respondent has suggested that this conclusion is contrary
to administrative interpretations issued by our staff and to
the implications in recent orders issued in connection with
applications of The United Corporation under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act with respect to United's sale
of common stock of a subsidiary through brokers on the
New York Stock Exchange. The administrative interpreta-
tions referred to were to the general effect that an under-
writer selling for a controlling stockholder over the ex-
7 Id at 600.
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change might conceivably be entitled to the exemption
under Section 4 (2) if his activities were confined strictly
to the usual brokerage functions, but that, as a practical
matter, his activities could not be so confined in connection
With a distribution of any substantial block of securities.
These interpretations arrived at the same ultimate result
as that which we have reached here. But the theory and
the qualification of the interpretation-which we agree are
inconsistent with our conclusion herein-were developed
against the background of a very different market than is
now prevalent. It has been only comparatively recently
that the problem has been presented in the context of a
market in which large blocks can frequently be sold with-
out solicitations or other sales activity. In that context,
the invalidity of the theory on which the interpretations
were based has become apparent. We have reached our
present conclusion on this phase of the case after careful
consideration of the entire problem and, to the extent that
the administrative interpretations referred to and the prin-
ciple involved in the United case may be inconsistent with
that conclusion, they must be overruled."'
The United Corporation was a public utility holding company
order to divest itself of the stock of operating subsidiaries under
the Holding Company Act. Between December, 1945 and May, 1946,
it sold on the New York Stock Exchange 600,000 shares of common
stock of its subsidiary, Columbia Gas & Electric Company. An
exemption under section 4 (1) & (2) was assumed from the Com-
mission's silence, because there was clear control and no registration
statement.
The above quoted excerpt from the Haupt case served to sup-
port the view of the securities industry that the Commission's
inaction on the United Corporation offering, which was a secondary
distribution if there ever was one, was consistent with the policy
it had theretofore followed to the effect that unsolicited trans-
' Id. at 607. The proceeding against Haupt was based upon § 15 (b) of the Exchange Act of
1934, which provides for the revocoton of the registration of a broker dealer for a willful violation
of the 1933 act and the regulations and rules thereunder as well as for other reasons. The Commis-
sion found that there had been a willful violation of the 1933 act but withheld revocation of the
license because the Commission had reversed its previous position on the § 4 (2) exemption. The




actions for an affiliate of the issuer did not make the broker an
underwriter notwithstanding that he was selling for an issuer within
the meaning of section 2 (11). Thus, under this policy the broker's
part of the transaction was exempt under section 4 (2) and the
affiliate's part of the transaction was exempt under section 4 (1)
because the affiliate was not an issuer, underwriter or dealer.
The Commission's remarks about the United case were unfor-
tunate. it is rather difficult to accept the explanation that the ad-
ministrative interpretations (which apparently prevailed as late as
1946 in favor of United Corporation) "were developed against the
background of a very different market" from that which existed at
the time of the Haupt case, considering that the Haupt sales cc-
curred almost two years prior to the United sales. In several cases
prior to Haupt it was clearly stated that dealers purchasing from
controlling stockholders with a view to distribution, as well as per-
sons selling for such stockholders in connection with the distribu-
tion, are "underwriters."9
The Haupt case was consistent with established precedent. The
United case was no part of such precedent. It was an exception. Per-
haps the exigency of divestment under the Holding Company Act
of 193510 justified the exception, but the Commission in the Haupt
case, rather than climbing back over this thorny limb simply sawed
it off.
In any event the Haupt case clearly pointed up the precarious
position of a selling affiliate and his broker. Where would the
line be drawn between the egregious transactions of the Schulte
interests and the case of Assistant Secretary Joe Pumpernickel,
who has waited three years to sell a few shares of Uncompagre Oil,
Inc.?
In 1951 the Commission promulgated Rule 154 which provides:
"Definition of Certain Terms Used in Section 4(2)
(a) The term 'brokers' transactions' in Section 4 (2) of
the Act shall be deemed to include transactions by a broker
acting as agent for the account of any person controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with, the issuer of
the securities which are the subject of the transactions
where-
(1) The broker performs no more than the usual
and customary broker's function,
9 In the Matter of Resources Corp. Internat'l, 7 S. E. C. 689 (1940); In the Matter of Thompson
Ross Securities Co., 6 S. E. C. 1111 (1940); In the Matter of Sweets Steel Co., 4 S. E. C. 589 (1939);
SEC v. Saphier, 1 S. E. C. Jud. Dec. 291 (1936).
S049 Stat. 838, 15 U. S. C. §§ 79 (a)-(z) (6) (1952).
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(2) The broker does no more than execute an order
or orders to sell as a broker and receives no more than
the usual or customary broker's commission, and the
broker's principal, to the knowledge of the broker,
makes no payment in connection with the execution
of such transactions to any other person.
(3) Neither the broker, nor to his knowledge his
principal, solicits or arranges for the solicitation of
orders to buy in anticipation of or in connection with
such transactions, and
(4) The broker is not aware of circumstances in-
dicating that his principal is an underwriter in respect
of the securities or that the transactions are part of a
distribution of securities on behalf of his principal.
(b) For the purpose of paragraph (a) of this Rule, the
term 'distribution' shall not apply to transactions involving
an amount not substantial in relation to the number of
shares or units of the security outstanding and the aggre-
gate volume of trading in such security. Without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, the term 'distribution' shall
not be deemed to include a sale or series of sales of secur-
ities which, together with all other sales of securities of the
same class by or on behalf of the same person within the
preceding period of six months, will not exceed the follow-
ing: (1) if the security is traded only otherwise than on a
securities exchange, approximately one percent of the
shares or units of such security outstanding at the time of
receipt by the broker of the order to execute such trans-
actions or (2) if the security is admitted to trading on a se-
curities exchange the lesser of approximately (A) one per
cent of the shares or units of such security outstanding at
the time of receipt by the broker of the order to execute
such transactions or (B) the largest aggregate reported
volume of trading on securities exchange during any one
week within the four calendar weeks preceding the re-
ceipt of such order.
(c) The term 'solicitation of such orders' in Section
4 (2) of the Act shall be deemed to include the solicitation
of an order to buy a security, but shall not be deemed to in-
clude the solicitation of an order to sell a security.
(d) Where within the previous 60 days a dealer has
made a written bid for a security or a written solicitation
of an offer to sell such security, the term 'solicitation' in
Section 4 (2) shall not be deemed to include an inquiry
regarding the dealer's bid or solicitation.""
As a practical matter, this rule afforded very little relief. It
codified the conclusions reached in the Haupt case, including cer-
tain subjective tests, such as the broker's knowledge of his prin-
cipal's activities, and provided a laborious formula for determining
what transaction shall be deemed not to constitute a "distribution"
by a selling stockholder.
It 17 C. F. R. 230.154 (Supp. 1957).
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The availability of the section 4 (2) exemption remains a com-
plex question of fact with respect to which the broker and the sell-
ing stockholder must act as their judgment dictates. Now that the
Regulation A exemption is not available for secondary offerings by
stockholders of newly organized corporations the restraint of con-
science may well diminish.
In practice insiders generally observe a minimum holding pe-
riod of one year to establish the requisite initial intention of pur-
chasing from an issuer for investment and not with a view to dis-
tribution. Such intention is not established ipso facto, but by that
time many corroborative circumstances can be established. The
holder of investment stock by reason of promotional services ren-
dered may divorce himself from management, or may sell in small
blocks to meet unanticipated financial reversals. The business and
purposes of the issuer may change drastically. There may be a mer-
ger which disrupts the original corporate plans and dilutes the con-
trol attributable to ownership of equity securities.
Selling unregistered securities allegedly taken for investment,
even where the seller is not in common control of the issuer, is not
without some risk to both principal and dealer,'2 but experience
indicates that the risk is largely theoretical. Assuming there is no
U The General Counsel of the Commission received an inquiry whether a dealer might resell
to the public, without registration, a block of securities bought from an initial purchaser who had
acquired the securities in conrection with a "private offering." Port of his reply, with respect to the
matters above discussed, reads: "I call your attention to my opinion set out in the next to the last
poragarph of Release No. 285, which states in substance that the answer to your question depends
upon whether the initial purchaser acquired the securities with a view to distribution, and further
points out that if his acquisitan was wth such intent, he would be an underwriter, so that in general
sales by dealers of securities bought from h:m would not be exempt from registration.
"You will appreciate that the intent of the initial purchaser at the time of the acquisition is a
question of fact upon which I can express no opinion.
"I wish to make clear, however, that I do not believe the fact that the initial purchaser has
stated that his original purchase was for investment and not for resale is necessarily conclusive on
this question. In my opinion there should be considered such other factors as: (1) the relation
between the issuer and the initial purchaser; (2) the business of the latter, as for example, whether
such purchaser is an underwriter or dealer in securities, and, if not, whether the purchase of such a
block of securities for investment is consistent with its geneari operations; and (3) the length of time
elapsing between the acquisition of the securities by the initial purchaser and the date of their pro-
posed resale.
"Of course, if the securities in question were in fact purchased by the initial purchaser for in-
vestment rather than for resole, dealers' sales thereof to the public would not necessitate registration
under the Securities Act.
"In conclusion, I feel that I should point out that even though a dealer is satisfied that a par-
ticular block of unregistered securities was bought by an initial purchaser for investment, he never-
theless takes the risk that, if his determination is incorrect sales by him of such securities will be
in violation of the registration requirements of the Act."--Op. of Gen'l Counsel, SEC Release No. 603
(Class C), 11 Fed. Reg. 10955 (1935).
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fraud (fraud being difficult to prove in the absence of flagrant mar-
ket manipulations) the Commission may do no more than investi-
gate and enjoin the selling stockholder, and in the case of a broker
or dealer it may take disciplinary action under section 15 (b) of the
Exchange Act,13 if it can prove a willful violation. 14 The purchaser
can invoke the civil liability provided by section 12 (1) of the Se-
curities Act, but usually, in relation to the amount involved, the
time and expense incurred in such proceedings are substantial, not
to mention the problems of discovery encountered in an action based
upon a secondary distribution.
The rash of mergers and consolidations in recent years, partic-
ularly in the case of promotional companies has not been without
Securities Act ramifications. Mergers are carried out under the "no
sale theory" pursuant to Rule 133 which provides:
"For purposes only of Section 5 of the Act, no 'sale,'
'offer to sell,' or 'offer for sale' shall be deemed to be in-
volved so far as the stockholders of a corporation are con-
cerned where, pursuant to statutory provisions in the state
of incorporation or provisions contained in the certificate
of incorporation, there is submitted to the vote of such
stockholders a plan or agreement for a statutory merger or
consolidation or reclassification of securities, or a proposal
for the transfer of assets of such corporation to another per-
son in consideration of the issuance of the securities of such
other person, under such circumstances that the vote of a
required favorable majority (1) will operate to authorize
the proposed transaction so far as concerns the corporation
whose stockholders are voting (except for the taking of ac-
tion by the directors of the corporation involved and for
compliance with such statutory provisions as the filing of
the plan or agreement with the appropriate state author-
ity), and (2) will bind all stockholders of such corporation
except to the extent that dissenting stockholders may be
entitled, under statutory provisions or provisions contained
in the certificate of incorporation, to receive the appraised
or fair value of their holdings. '""
This rule is not to be confused with section 3 (9) of the Securi-
ties Act which exempts from registration any security exchanged
by the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where
no commission or other remuneration is paid for soliciting such ex-
change. Hence the statutory provision is limited to situations where
the securities surrendered and those taken in exchange are both
issued by the same corporation.
Is 49 Stat. 1380 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78 (1952).
14 In the Matter of Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S. E. C. 1111 (1940), the Commission found
a dealer had willfully violated §§ 5 (a) & 17 (a) (2) of the Securities Act in effecfing sales by use
of a prospectus which stated that the stock was being sold at the market and which failed to state
that 60% of the outstanding stock was restricted from transfer, which operated as a restraint upon
market action. In the circumstances, the dealer's reliance upon advice of counsel was held to be no
defense to the charge of "willfull" violation.
Is 17 C. F. R. 230.133 (1957 Supp.). On October 2, 1956 the Commission announced a proposed
revision of Rule 133. (Securities Act Release No. 3698). An effect it would rescind the existing Rule
133 and substitute therefor a rule which would define an "offer" to include the solicitation of a
vote, consent of authorization of stockholders of a corporation in favor of such mergers, consolida-
tions, reclassifications of securities and transfers of assets. Under the revised rule a "sale" would
be deemed to occur when the approval of stockholders-to such corporate action occurs.
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An implicit condition of Rule 133 is a bona fide corporate pur-
pose. It was not intended merely as a device for affecting an un-
registered secondary distribution, notwithstanding the more than
occasional efforts to so use it. In SEC v. Micro Moisture Controls,
Inc.,16 it was held that section 4 (1) and Rule 133 of the Securities
Act of 1933 were inapplicable to an exchange of stock of one cor-
poration for assets of another corporation where the acquiring cor-
poration was controlled by stockholders of the acquired corpora-
tion and the exchange was merely a step toward the public sale
of stock issued in exchange. The court found that the persons who
were selling the stock controlled the issuer, since they had the pow-
er to direct its policies and to obtain the required signatures on a
registration statement.
Also, contrary to a rather popular misconception, securities is-
sued pursuant to a Rule 133 transaction do not automatically ac-
quire an exempt status. In the jargon of the brokerage fraternity
this misconception is referred to as "freeing-up front end stock by
a merger or consolidation." In the Matter of Thompson Ross Secur-
ities Co., mentioned above, it was contended by a registered broker
dealer that securities issued under section 3 (a) (9) are forever ex-
empted from registration. In holding against this contention the
Commission stated:
"Unlike securities which fall within Sec. 3 (a) (2) to 3
(a) (8) inclusive, of the Act, there is nothing in the intrin-
sic nature of securities falling within Sec. 3 (a) (9) which
justifies their permanent exemption from registration. The
basis of the exemption under Sec. 3 (a) (9) is merely the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of securities. The
sale to the public of a large block of securities previously
exempted from registration when they were exchanged for
other securities possesses all of the dangers attendant upon
a new offering of securities to the public by the issuer. Sec-
tion 3 (a) (9) does not therefore permanently exempt se-
curities offered in a transaction of exchange."17
This holding is equally applicable to merger exchanges pursuant to
Rule 133.
16 148 F. Supp. 558 (S. D. N. Y. 1957).
"6 S. E. C. at 1118.
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Assuming that the merger, consolidation, reclassification or
transfer of assets is motivated by a bona fide corporate purpose it
should be noted that Rule 133 begins, "For purposes of Section 5
only. . . ." Thus stock issued in reliance thereon is exempt from
registration only.
The Colorado and Delaware statutes on merger and consolida-
tion, which are more or less standard, contain no specific require-
ments about the information to be set forth in the proxy statement.
It is not an uncommon practice to submit the merger proposal with-
out financial statements and with very little factual data. Frequent-
ly, the stockholders of the constituents are only told how many
shares they will exchange for each share of the continuing corpora-
tion, and the approximate market value of each. Such facts as as-
sumed liabilities, outstanding stock purchase options, management
contracts, fees and costs of the merger, royalty burdens on proper-
ties to be acquired and other material facts may not be mentioned.
As this is the type of omission and half truth prohibited by section
17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule X 10 (B) (5) 18 un-
der the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it was believed that there
would be no serious abuse of the section 5 exemption pursuant to
the "no sale" theory. Moreover, companies with listed securities are
also subject to the detailed proxy regulations adopted pursuant to
section 14 of the Exchange Act. Rule X 14 (A) (9) 11 requires that
proxy statements contain a full disclosure of material facts.
Experience under Rule 133 indicates that this view was highly
sanguine. It became apparent under the Investment Company Act
of 194020 to which the "no sale" rule was extended shortly after its
enactment that there was insufficient protection to shareholders
against consolidation of affiliated companies on unequal terms. Sec-
tion 17 (a) of the Investment Company Act prohibits sales of assets
or securities between corporations controlled by a registered in-
vestment company, unless the sales have been approved as fair and
equitable by the commission.
In Phoenix Security Corp.,21 two corporations controlled by a
registered company decided to merge. The Commission decided that
- 17 C. F. R. 240.10 (b) (5) (1949).
19 Id. at 240.14 (a) (9).
2D 54 Stat. 847, 15 U. S. C. 1 80 (a) (1).(52) (1952).
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since the definition of the word "sale" in the Investment Company
Act is practically the same as in the Securities Act, the "no sale"
rule should be held applicable to the transaction in question and,
hence, the terms of the merger did not have to be approved. Under
such literal interpretation, two affiliates controlled by a third might
well decide to merge on unfair and inequitable terms, and minority
shareholders would have as little protection as in case of a conven-
tional sale of securities between the companies. In 1953, the Com-
mission reversed the Phoenix case stating that continued experience
under the Investment Company Act demonstrated that application
of the "no sale" theory to section 17 thereof tended to defeat the
legislative purpose of that section.
2
1
One of the few cases involving an alleged civil liability ground-
ed upon a merger transaction is National Supply Co. v. Stanford
University.2 Denial of recovery was based primarily on the stock-
holder's negligence in failing to make timely objection to the plan
of consolidation. The contention that the proxy statement was mis-
leading was rather summarily disposed of by the court. Stanford
argued that it was led to believe that it might retain its preferred
stock, nothwithstanding the consolidation, and that it was not ad-
vised of its right by a timely objection to claim the appraised value
of its shares. The court said that a dissatisfied stockholder should
be held to a degree of diligence in informing himself of, and in as-
serting, his rights.
"He may not by inaction speculate upon the outcome of
the merger. He is not permitted to plead ignorance of the
law of the state of incorporation if he has negligently failed
to inform himself thereof. He may not unreasonably delay
the bringing of suit, either for the value of his shares or for
equitable relief against what he claims is an unfair merger,
to the prejudice of existing shareholders or those who may
become such in the interim."24
The court stated that certain of the findings of the trial court
(which had held in Stanford's favor) indicated that the trial court
was influenced by the contention that the Securities Act of 1933
had been violated. However, since the SEC had filed a brief amicus
curiae indicative of its view that the consolidation did not involve
a "sale" of securities, and that the civil liabilities provisions of the
Act were inapplicable, the court considered neither the questions
of section 5 violation nor possible violations of section 17 (a) or
Rule X 10 (B) (5). It merely concluded "Without going into the
matter, we may say that we are in accord with the views of the
Commission.
2 5
Whatever the respective merits and defects of the proposed re-
vision of Rule 133 may be, it must be considered in the light of an
era of numerous facile mergers and consolidations.
2 In the Matter of E. I. Dupont Investment Co., Act Release No. 1837 (1953), C. C. H. Fed. Sec.
Law Rep. P. 76, 213.
23 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 773 (1943).
2' Id. at 692.
2 Id. at 694.
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COLORADO STATUTES-SOME CHANGES MADE BY THE
FORTY-FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY
By CHARLES S. THOMAS
Charles S. Thomas received his B.A. degree from Dartmouth College
and his LL.B. degree from the University of Denver College of Law. He
is a member of the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations.
The forty-first general assembly passed 316 bills in its ninety-
day session. At least fifteen were vetoed by the governor. A large
number became law when signed. The rest, with only a few excep-
tions, became law on May 2, 1957.
Of interest is House Bill 206 which allows persons, private en-
tities and political subdivisions to sue the state or any of its de-
partments, commissions or officers for damages caused by failure
of the Georgetown dam. Of particular interest, but unfortunately,
only in passing, are House Bill 278 which reorganizes the state's
supervisory machinery for banks and rewrites a considerable por-
tion of the banking laws, and House Bill 236 which makes changes
in the Blue Sky Law and the Fraudulent Practice Act concerning
securities.
Most of the bills treated here amend or change existing law.
We intend to spotlight the changes. Where possible, effective dates
of bills which become law at various times after May 2, 1957, are
furnished.
ANNULMENT
House Bill 77 sets forth seven specific situations in which a
marriage is voidable. The operation, procedure and effect under the
first one, "nonage," are virtually unchanged. The remaining six are
substantially the conditions making marriages voidable at common
law. The bill provides that an action for annulment will lie
if brought within one year after discovery of the existence
of grounds therefor, unless there has been ratification by acquies-
cence. It empowers the court to determine marital status and enter
its decree annuling a voidable marriage or declaring a marriage to
be void. In addition, it provides for the entry of orders for custody
and child support, suit money, costs and any other matters in con-
troversy, and for a procedure in the event one party is mentally
incompetent. Divorce and annulment actions cannot be combined.
It does not apply to actions begun prior to its effective date, July 1,
1957.
CITIES AND TOWNS
Senate Bill 236 includes school districts, municipalities, and
other political subdivisions under the term "landowner," thus re-
moving a definite obstacle to their annexation to cities and towns.
Disconnection. House Bill 118 provides that disconnected ter-
ritory shall continue to be subject to certain zoning regulations of
its former municipality for a period of six years after disconnection.
Eminent Domain. Senate Bill 232 authorizes a city, in certain
cases, to proceed under either the article relating to eminent do-
main by cities or the general article thereon.
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Exclusion from Water Conservation Districts. House Bill 243
authorizes cities and towns included in water conservation districts
against their expressed wishes to withdraw therefrom.
CONVEYANCES
Sworn Certificates. Senate Bill 222 requires, with certain ex-
ceptions, that a sworn certificate in duplicate be submitted with
each deed conveying an interest in real estate. The certificate shall
state the total consideration paid, the relationship or other close
connection, if any, existing between the grantor and the grantee
and such other information as may be required by the Colorado Leg-
islative Council. A fee of one cent for each $100 of consideration is
charged the seller. This bill becomes effective July 1, 1957.
CORONERS
Four bills' collectively change the present law concerning the
duties of coroners and deputy coroners in cases of death without
medical attendance and death under suspicious circumstances. No-
tice of death is to be given directly to the coroner who is to. notify
the district attorney before proceeding, with the inquest or invest-
igation. If either the coroner or the district attorney deems it ad-
visable, the coroner is required to cause a post mortem examination
to be made by a licensed physician. Coroners are authorized to
summon licensed physicians and to provide for their compensation.
Deputy coroners are authorized to act in place of coroners at all
times, instead of only during the coroner's absence, incapacity or
unavailability.
COUNTY OFFICERS
Suspension and Removal. Boards of county commissioners are
now empowered to suspend a county official found guilty of a fel-
ony or infamous crime and to reinstate with back pay or discharge
him depending on the outcome of the last appeal that is taken.'
County Treasurers-Fees. Henceforth, according to this law,
county treasurers will charge no fees for keeping their records of
tax sales, but will be allowed reasonable compensation for this serv-
ice by their county commissioners.'
COURTS
Insanity Pleas. The trial court is given discretion to determine
whether all of the issues should be tried together or whether the
insanity plea should be tried separately.4
Judgment Within Ten Days. On failure of the justice of the
peace in a criminal action to enter his judgment or decision within
ten days after trial, the defendant, on motion, is entitled to a dis-
missal.5
Penitentiary or Reformatory-Sentence. Senate Bill 19 gives
criminal courts the discretion of sentencing persons between six-
teen and twenty-five years of age who are convicted of a felony to
either the reformatory or the penitentiary, except in convictions
1 House Bills 88, 90, 91 & 92.
Senate Bill 29.
. Senate Bill 165.
4 Senate Bill 221.
5 House Bill 46.
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involving life imprisonment, first and second degree murder, and
cases where the person convicted has been previously convicted of
a felony. Excludes from the effects of this act the statutes concern-
ing probation and sex offenders. 6
Suspension of Fines and Stays of Execution. House Bill 182
authorizes police magistrates, municipal judges, and justices of the
peace to suspend "any or all parts of the fine accrued or jail sen-
tence imposed, or both, and to grant a stay of execution not to ex-
ceed thirty days, on any fine accrued or* jail sentence imposed, or
both."
CRIMES
Burglary. An amendment changes the definition of "burglary"
by removing the word "maliciously," by providing that the entry
be made into a portion of a "building" or "trailer," and by elim-
inating the various names for structures which the word "building"
included. Further it extends the law to include an "attempt to break
and enter" and provides penalties therefor.
7
Checks-Insufficient Funds. Senate Bill 306 redefines this of-
fense. It includes the issuance or delivery of such a check with in-
tent to defraud and deceive, (1) to obtain something of value or (2)
to pay for goods, rents or services. It provides increasing penalties
for subsequent violations.
Checks-No Account. The issuance or delivery of a check on
no account or no funds in payment for goods, rents or services with
the intent to defraud is declared to be a felony.8
DAMAGES
Wrongful Death. Maximum recoverable damages are $25,000.
This applies only to actions accruing after the effective date of the
law.9
EVIDENCE
Blood Grouping Tests in Paternity Cases. House Bill 133 au-
thorizes the court to order a blood grouping test on motion of the
defendant. Results of the test are admissable only if they exclude
the defendant as the father.
Business and Public Records as Evidence. Senate Bill 275 per-
mits copies of bank or trust company trust department records to
be introduced in evidence under the uniform photographic records
act.
EXTRADITION
Senate Bill 249 extends the provisions of the extradition laws to
include probation and parole violators and empowers the parole
board to apply for the issuance of requisitions for the return of
such persons from other states.
GAME AND FISH
Penalties Assessed for Certain Violations. Senate Bill 185 lists
IColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-16.1 to I1 and §§ 39-19-i to 9 (1953).
House Bill 173.
Senate Bill 304.
3 House Bill 111. See Hall, Damages for Death-Limited or Unlimited, 34 DICTA 32 (1957); Note,34 DICTA 41 (1957).
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certain specific game and fish violations and sets a fine for each.
Moreover it authorizes officers to serve violators penalty assess-
ment tickets which operate as summonses if not paid. In case of
prosecution for the specific violation, the maximum penalties apply.
INCOME TAX
The "Golden Gimmick." House Bill 232 provides that beginning
April 15, 1958, income taxpayers will no longer have the option of
paying their preceding year's income tax in quarterly installments.
The entire 1957 tax will be due on April 15, 1958, and any subse-
quent years' taxes will be due in full on the 15th day of April fol-
lowing the end of that year.
Exemptions and Reductions. House Bill 49 decreases the reduc-
tion in income tax from 20% to 15%, increases the personal exemp-
tion to $750, and excludes (1) labor union pensions, (2) federal civil
service annuities, and (3) OASI payments from taxable income.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Petitioners. Fees are fixed
by the commission and paid from the compensation awarded. If the
award is denied, the commission pays the fee.' 0
INHERITANCE TAX
Credits. House Bill 72 rewrites the present law to provide a
workable formula for determining the inheritance tax credit for
property which, within three years previously, has been taxed in
the estate of a decedent. It provides a ratio, or fraction, which is the
relationship of the traceable taxed property in the prior estate to
the total property therein. The same ratio, or fraction is determined
in the current estate. This fraction is applied to the tax due in the
current estate. If the resultant tax in the prior estate is greater
than the resultant tax in the current estate, a tax credit equal to
the resultant tax in the current estate is allowed. If the resultant
tax in the prior estate is less than the resultant tax in the current
estate, the credit is equal to the resultant tax in the prior estate.
LABOR
Increased Benefits. Increases have been provided in workmen's
compensation benefits," occupational disease benefits, 2 and un-
employment compensation benefits.' 3
MENTALLY ILL
Adjudication and Commitment. Senate Bill 161 extends the
jurisdiction of county courts to cover all persons in their counties
alleged to be mentally' ill and introduces such temporary emer-
gency procedures as "protective arrests" and "short-term involun-
tary hospitalization" not to exceed six months. The changes are
effective July 1, 1957.
Estates of Mentally Ill Persons and Minors. Senate Bill 162 re-
writes the provisions governing the appointment of personal rep-
" Senate Bill 102.
" Senate Bill 289.
12 Senate Bill 291.
. Senate iBil 290.
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resentatives for nonresident minors and for resident and nonresi-
dent mentally ill persons. Also it provides a method of sealing and
inventorying a mentally ill person's safety deposit box under super-
vision of the county court and provides a voluntary adjudication
procedure on petition of a mentally ill person to the county court.
MOTOR VEHICLES
Non-resident Motorists-Agent for Service. Senate Bill 43 pro-
vides that the operation in this state of a motor vehicle, within the
scope of his employment, by the agent, servant or employee of a
nonresident designates the Secretary of State such nonresident's
agent for service of process.
Restricted Operators' Licenses. House Bill 375 permits the is-
suance of restricted licenses to operate motor vehicles to certain
mentally ill persons upon proper certification of the lunacy com-
mission, approved by the court.
Release of Security Deposits. Senate Bill 362 makes it the duty
of persons who have deposited security in accordance with the
Safety Responsibility Law to notify the Director of Revenue of
the status of the claim before the expiration of one year from the
date of deposit. Security deposits of depositors who cannot be lo-
cated will escheat to the state after thirty days' notice by regis-
tered mail sent to the address of record.
OIL AND GAS LEASES
House Bill 384 requires the lessee under an oil and gas, or other
mineral, lease to record an acknowledged release thereof in the
county where the land is situated within ninety days after forfeit-
ure or expiration of the lease. On his failure to do so, the landown-
er may sue and recover $100 in damages plus costs.
PAROLE AND PROBATION
Violators. Senate Bill 347 adds a new amendment to the present
interstate compact whereby the parole or probation violator may
be incarcerated in the state where he is found rather than being re-
turned to the original state of incarceration. Furthermore, Senate
Bill 348 authorizes the Executive Director of the State Department
of Parole to deputize any regular employee of Colorado or any other
state, thus giving that employee the powers of a police official
to return parole and probation violators.
PLANNING AND ZONING
Plats of County Land. Senate Bill 154 requires that subdivision
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Men's Hats & Furnishings
Men's Shop Seven fifteen Seventeenth Street KE. 4-0334
May-June, 1957
plats and plats of public works pertaining to lands within three
miles of any municipality be submitted to such municipality for its
recommendations, or for a period of thirty days, before further ac-
tion can be taken thereon.
PRISONERS
Right to Consult Counsel. House Bill 21 subjects peace officers
to penalties for failure to allow a prisoner to see and consult counsel
upon the request of a friend, relative or spouse of the prisoner, if
the prisoner expressly consents to see such counsel. Heretofore, the
penalties applied only when the prisoner was denied counsel on his
own request.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
Senate Bill 200 declares monopolies, combinations and contracts
which fix the price or quantity of an article in commerce to be in
restraint of trade and illegal. Contracts with innocent persons which
are related to or grow out of any violation are void. The statute
provides for injunctive procedure and criminal penalties.
WATER
Adjudication Decrees-Eighteen-Year Limitation. Senate Bill
176 provides that a water priority decree shall not be set aside after
eighteen years for any defect in the adjudication proceedings, if for
such period it has been recognized by water officials and the water
thereof has been applied to beneficial use whenever needed.
Alternate Diversion Point-Cities and Towns. Senate Bill 326
authorizes municipalities to maintain one alternate diversion point,
provided such right is evidenced by court decree.
Conservancy Districts. House Bill 289 provides a method for
dissolving them.
Underground Water. Senate Bill 113 provides for an eight-mem-
ber "Ground Water Commission" to be appointed by the Governor
and confirmed by the Senate. The Commission is to be assisted by
the water conservation board and the state engineer. Upon comple-
tion of a survey of the state's general ground water resources, it
may designate portions thereof as "tentatively critical ground water
districts," in which the drilling or enlarging of wells is restricetd.
In such districts the commission will conduct the election of a dis-
trict advisory board. The board, by unanimous vote can remove the
restriction. It requires filings with the state engineer on all new
wells and on all existing wells and gives the state engineer author-
ity to control well drillers. Exempted from the act are all wells used
solely for stock watering, artesian wells with discharge pipes of di-
ameters less than three inches, and domestic wells with discharge
pipes of two inches diameter or less.
WILLS
Depositions. In cases where a deposition is taken to prove the
execution of a will in a proceeding to admit it to probate, a new
statute will permit a photographic copy certified by the judge, in-
stead of the will itself, to be attached to the dedimus.
14
Disclaimer. House Bill 365 provides a method whereby a person
entitled to a legacy, devise or bequest under a will may disclaim it,
and the bill states the effects of a disclaimer.
14 House Bill 258.
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THE FATE OF THE COURT BILLS IN THE FORTY-FIRST
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
By PETER H. HOLME, JR.
Peter H. Holme, Jr. received his A.B. degree from Yale and his LL.B de-
gree from the University of Colorado College of Law. He is a member of
the Colorado, Denver and American Bar Associations, and a member
as well as past chairman of the Judiciary Committees of both the Colo-
rado and Denver associations. Mr. Holme has been a frequent con-
tributor to low reviews and bar journals.
Legislation affecting judges and courts is, of course, of deep
interest to the bench but of almost equal interest to the bar. Con-
sequently, this post mortem is tendered so that the lawyers of the
state may be aware of what happened to the various bills which
were proposed in the 41st General Assembly which would have
changed and in most cases improved Colorado's judicial system.
THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PLAN
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 2 embodied the long sought
reform in our method of selecting judges for our major, courts. This
bill to remove the selection of judges from the political arena ob-
viously had to be in the form of a constitutional amendment. In
S.C.R. No. 2, the legislature was being asked to place the proposed
constitutional amendment upon the ballot in 1958. Several hearings
were held before the judiciary committees of the House and Senate,
at which time was generously alloted to both proponents and op-
ponents to express their views. Much serious consideration was de-
voted to this concurrent resolution with the result that many legis-
lators, formerly either neutral or indeed vigorously opposed to its
subject matter, became interested and in many cases indicated a
change of position in favor of the proposal. Owing to a policy pro-
posed by the Governor and adopted by the Assembly, however, no
final action was taken placing any constitutional amendment on
the ballot. It was agreed that an interim committee consisting of
the judiciary committees of the House and Senate would be formed
to consider, between now and the 1958 session of the General As-
sembly, all constitutional amendment proposals. In line with this
policy, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 2 was referred to this com-
mittee on constitutional amendments. During the ensuing months
additional opportunity will be presented for further discussion of
the judicial selection plan amendment.
JUDGES' COMPENSATION BILLS
Quite a number of bills were presented which would have in-
creased the compensation of judges of the various courts. For su-
preme court judges there were House Bills No. 5 and No. 38;
for district court, House Bill No. 3; for the county and juvenile
courts, House Bills 25, 303 and 408, relating to certain counties
DICTA
May-June, 1957
only, and Senate Bill 115, relating to the Denver courts; and for the
superior court, House Bill 50. There was also a bill for compensation
of courts of record generally,' and a bill to adjust the compensation
of justices of the peace.
2
In addition to the direct salary bills, there was a bill which
would have increased the expense allowances for judges' and one
which would have furnished additional expense money for judges
while on duty outside their home counties.4
Without exception all of these bills failed of passage.
The only bill passed which had to do with financial assistance
to the courts was the retirement bill.
5
QUALIFICATIONS OF JUDGES
Another bill affecting courts which did pass and was signed
by the Governor is House Bill 57 which provides that henceforth
with the exception of incumbent judges, any new candidate for
the office of County Judge in counties of the first or second class
must, as a pre-requisite qualification, be a lawyer.
JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL BILLS
A bill6 relating to criminal proceedings before the justice courts
and requiring the judge to render a decision within ten days has
been passed and was signed by the Governor. Likewise, a bill7
granting to the justice and police courts the power to suspend fines
and grant stays of execution was passed and signed.
On the other hand the following bills failed: House Bill 11,
involving appeals from police, municipal and justice courts; House
Bills 381 and 259 relating to the jurisdiction of the superior court;
and House Bill 269 relating to the superior court's power to grant
probation. Also House Bill 308 relating to justices and constables
failed of passage.
1 House Bill 156.














Dog's Bill of Rights
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Actual records trace the mammal Carnivora, family Canidae,
back to the Egyptian tomb of Amten of the Fourth Dynasty -
about 3500 B.C. Since that time the service, devotion and heroism
of the dog have earned him recognition as "Man's Best Friend," a
title enjoyed by no other member of the animal kingdom. Despite
this praiseworthy heredity, man seems to be questioning the under-
lying friendliness of the dog. In the last century, dogs have been
the object of increasing claim compensation. This new source of
lawsuits is significant since there are an estimated 13,000,000 dogs
in the United States - one dog for every ten persons.
In early legal history, the dog was protected by being allowed
"one free bite." But courts have discarded that principle' for a
new legal fiction of liability - a fiction spuriously called "vicious
propensities." While the vicious propensity test appears universal
in the legal literature, its application is variously handled.
Some jurisdictions using the vicious propensity test determine
dog bite liability in terms of nuisance. While a dog is not a nuisance
per se,2 the courts which apply the nuisance theory investigate the
disposition and conduct of the dog and the manner in which he has
been kept in determining the nuisance question. Following this
theory, it has been said that, "a person who keeps a dog which is
dangerous to mankind with knowledge of its vicious propensities is
liable on the theory of nuisance for injuries resulting therefrom to
others, irrespective of the question of negligence on his part."'
Another line of authority establishes liability in terms of negli-
gence. In these cases it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish
the dog's vicious propensities in order to show negligence or fault
on the part of the owner. The negligence or fault is established
1 See, e. g., Andrews v. Smith, 324 Pa. 455, 188 At. 146 (1936).2
Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205, 290 P.2d 742 (1955).
'Annot., 79 A.L.R. 1060, 1062 (1932).
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upon showing that the owner did not take steps which would pre-
vent injury or damage after he became aware of the dog's vicious
nature.4
A third theory of dog bite liability is that which Colorado has
recognized. It appears that the Colorado Supreme Court imposes
strict liability on a dog owner who has prior knowledge of his dog's
vicious propensities. In Barger v. Jimerson,5 the court said, "It is
quite evident that defendants did not at any time carelessly or in-
tentionally allow the dog to run at large. Their liability was in
keeping such a dog and they did so at their peril."6
Another form of strict liability is found in the statutes of Con-
necticut and Massachusetts. These identical statutes impose strict
liability on the keeper of a- dog for any damage which the dog does
unless the damage was a result of trespass (or other tort), or of
teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog.7 Florida," Iowa,9 New
Hampshire, 10 Ohio11 and Rhode Island" have statutory provisions
which are similar in wording and in effect.
Unless otherwise provided by statute, a necessary element of
proof for establishing dog bite liability is proof of the vicious pro-
pensity of the dog. The test for vicious propensity appears to be uni-
versal. The plaintiff must show: (1) that the dog had exhibited certain
tendences, (2) that the tendencies were of the nature to put prudent
persons on guard against possible injury, and (3) that the tendencies
were known to the owner prior to the injury for which redress
is sought.
1 3
The element of vicious propensity being essential in an action
for dog bite regardless of the theory upon which liability is based,
it is obvious that, unless otherwise provided by statute, simple
proof of a dog bite and damage therefrom does not make out a
prima facie case for the plantiff. It is in the area of proof of vicious
propensity that many dog bite claimants fail. The authorities have
set forth some important guide posts for such proof.
Woulfe v. D'Antoni, 158 So. 394 (La. App. 1935).
Barger v. Jimerson, 130 Colo. 459, 276 P.2d 744 (1954).6
Id. at 462, 276 P.2d at 745.
Conn. Gen. Stat. c. 151a, § 1842d (Supp. 1955); Mass. Ann.. Laws, c. 140, § 155 (1949).
5 Fla. Stat. § 767.04 (1953).
Iowa Code § 351.28 (1946).
'oN H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 466.19 (1955).
SOhio Rev. Code Ann. § 955.28 (1953).
R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 639, § 3 (1938).
is See note 5 supro.
DICTA
May-June, 1957
What types of prior tendencies amount to vicious propensities?
Following the rationale of the early "one free bite" principle, a prior
attack on a human has been held sufficient to prove vicious pro-
pensities.' Evidence that a trained watchdog snarled and showed
his teeth when petted by guests at the dog owner's hotel was also
considered sufficient proof.15 The ferocious and violent nature of
a dog as evidenced by his barking, running to and lunging upon a
fence when humans came near the fence has been held, by the
Colorado Supreme Court, to be adequate proof of vicious propen-
sities.' 6 However, the Pennsylvania court has said that the mere
fact that the person bitten was afraid of the dog prior to the bite
does not prove the dog was vicious."
What constitutes adequate owner knowledge of vicious propen-
sities? The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
held that keeping and training a dog as a watchdog warrants the
inference that the owner has knowledge of the dog's vicious pro-
pensities. 8 However, the Pennsylvania court has held that the mere
keeping of a German shepherd to protect property against intruders
is not sufficient to show that vicious propensities were known to
the owner. 9 Constant owner admissions that the dog was "bad,"
made after the injury but prior to the trial, were held to constitute
proof that the admitting owner had knowledge of the dog's vicious
propensities.20 The Colorado court has held that a dog owner had
knowledge of his dog's viciousness upon a showing that he kept the
animal confined because it was inclined to jump at approaching hu-
mans.21 Furthermore, the owner must have had personal knowledge
of the vicious propensities. Thus it has been held that the knowledge
of a neighbor or of the owner's yardman is not imputed to the own-
er.2 However, the knowledge of a servant who has control of the
dog may be imputed. 3 In Colorado, an owner who knows or should
know that his animal has been exposed to rabies is charged with
that knowledge and is liable for the consequences of an injury in-
flicted while his dog is rabid.
4
One might conclude, without consulting the authorities, that a
trespasser has no cause of action for dog bite. However, this posi-
tion is not supported by the courts. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has held that, as a matter of law, the mere fact that the injured
person was a trespasser at the time of an attack by a "vicious"
animal does not defeat his action.25 The theory supporting this
decision was aptly stated in a leading case involving trespassing
persons who are injured by animals found to have vicious propensi-
ties. Thus in Marble v. Ross, 28 the Massachusetts court reasoned
14 See, e. g., Peyronnin v. Riley, 15 La. App. 393, 132 So. 235 (1931).
25 Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943).
1s See note 5 supra.
17 Fink v. Miller, 330 Pa. 193, 198 Ati. 666 (1938).
18 See note 15 supro.
10 Andrews v. Smith, 324 Pa. 455, 188 Atl. 146 (1936).
Moore v. Smith, 6 So. 2d 803 (La. App. 1942).
' See note 5 supra.
22 See note 4 supra.
2 Benko v. Stepp, 199 Okla. 119, 184 P.2d 615 (1947); accord, Young v. Estep, 178 Wash. 561,
35 P.2d 80 (1934) (chimpanzee).
2 Carlberg v. Willmott, 87 Colo. 374, 287 Pac. 863 (1930).
25 Eberling v. Mutillod, 90 N. J. L. 478, 101 Ati. 519 (1917).
20 Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44 (1878).
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that if a trespasser is injured by an animal which has vicious pro-
pensities known to the owner, the owner vicariously inflicts injury
on the trespasser in a wanton manner. The court supported its posi-
tion by citing the time-honored principle that a landowner may not
inflict a wilful and wanton injury on a trespasser-a position anala-
gous to the spring gun cases so frequently found in texts.
Children are particularly protected aginst the defense of
trespass. In a 1934 Pennsylvania case,27 an owner who kept a dog
with known vicious propensities was held liable to an injured three
year old, notwithstanding the defendant's allegation of trespass.
A Louisiana court imposed liability on an owner of a known vi-
cious dog without considering the owner's allegation that the
twelve year old victim was a trespasser.2 6
In spite of the principle that trespassers are protected against
vicious dogs, it does not follow that trained watchdogs are legal
booby-traps. The determining question in an action by a trespasser
injured by a trained watchdog is the care with which the watchdog
owner has kept his dog. The New York appellate division has
held that a dog known to be vicious can be kept to protect one's
property provided the owner uses caution to confine the dog so that
it may move only in the area where premises are to be protected.29
The owner who meets the standard of caution calculated to avoid
wilful injury to the innocent trespasser need not give the tres-
passer notice of the dog's vicious propensity.2 0
An interesting sidelight on dog bite liability is presented in
cases where business invitees are bitten by dogs. Apparently, in-
vitee status does not alter the vicious propensity test nor does it
alter the application of the test. In Zarek v. Fredericks,"' a federal
court of appeals established that the plaintiff was a business invitee
and then stated, "The question, so far as it concerns liability, is
limited to the sufficiency of proof that the dog was vicious and the
defendant knew or had reason to know that fact."32 Similarly, in
Splaine v. Eastern Dog Club, Inc.," the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts granted "business visitor" status to the plaintiff
and added that the defendant dog club owed the plaintiff a duty to
usc reasonable care to keep the plaintiff, a dog exhibitor, free of
harm from other dogs at the dog show. However the court conclud-
ed that, notwithstanding this duty, there was no proof of the of-
fending dog's vicious propensity prior to its biting the plaintiff and
therefore the defendant was not liable.
Common law liability for dog bite continues in most juris-
dictions, with the qualifications above mentioned, unless changed
by statute or replaced by new legal fictions. If there is any signifi-
cant trend discernable, it is the extending of the definition of vi-
cious propensity to include less offensive kinds of canine conduct.
2 Darbly v. Clare Food and Relish Co., 111 Pa. Super. 537, 170 Atl. 387 (1934).
See note 20 supra.
Woodbridge v. Marks, 17 App. Div. 139, 45 N. Y. Supp. 156 (3d Dep't 1897).
30 Ibid.
138 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1943).
82 Id. at 690.




Constitutional Law-Equal Protection in Class Legislation-
Colorado Sunday Closing Statute Upheld
By THOMAS A. NELSON, JR.
Thomas A. Nelson, Jr. is a second year student at the University of
Denver College of Law, and a member of the DICTA staff.
Plaintiffs, automobile dealers, were precluded by a Colorado
statute' from selling automobiles on Sundays. Other businesses, in-
cluding filling stations, motor repair shops, auto accessory business-
es and farm machinery dealers were allowed to operate on Sundays.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the statute violated
both the Colorado constitution's prohibition of "special laws"' and
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution's fourteenth
amendment.' The Colorado Supreme Court initially held the act
unconstitutional4 but on rehearing declared it constitutional. Mosko
v. Dunbar, 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957).
Since judicial construction has given the federal equal protec-
tion clause the same meaning as the Colorado constitution's "spe-
cial laws" provision, consideration of one is necessarily considera-
tion of both. The Supreme Court of Colorado has considered the
issue of the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws several times
before. The previous cases, like the instant case, concerned legisla-
tion directed at particular segments of the business community
rather than all-inclusive Sunday closing laws. In Denver v. Bach,'
an 1899 case, the supreme court held an ordinance which prohibited
the sale of clothing on Sunday to be unconstitutional as class legis-
lation prohibited by the Colorado constitution. A similar question
arose several years later in McClelland v. Denver,6 dealing with an
ordinance which forbade barbering on Sundays. The high court in
this instance declared the ordinance constitutional. Two years later
Mergren v. Denver7 questioned the constitutionality of an ordinance
precluding Sunday operation of meat markets and grocery stores.
The supreme court, following the Bach case, found this ordinance to
be class legislation forbidden by the state constitution." Then, in a
1938 case,9 the Colorado court ruled on a Denver ordinance which
prohibited the sale of new and used automobiles on Sundays. The
ordinance was upheld against a contention that it was discrimina-
tory special or class legislation. It should be noted that the ordi-
nance upheld in 1938 was substantially identical to the statute in-
volved in the Mosko case.
'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-20-1 to 3 (Supp. 1955).
:Colo. Const. art. 5, § 25 (1876).
U. S Const. amend. XIV. 1 1.
8 8 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 16 (1956).
526 Colo. 530, 58 Pac. 1089 (1899).
636 Cola. 486, 86 Pac. 126 (1906).
, 46 Colo. 385, 104 Pac. 395 (1909).
8 Accord: Allen v. Colorado Springs, 101 Colo. 498, 75 P.2d 141 (1937) (invalidated similar ordi-
nance of Colorado Springs).
9 Rosenbaum v. Denver, 102 Colo. 530, 81 P.2d 760 (1938).
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The opinion in the instant case declared that the new and used
automobile business is a business separate and distinct from any
other business, and that the statute treats equally all within the
business. Thus the court found that the act afforded all auto deal-
ers the equal protection of the laws. In so holding, the Colorado
court adopted from its previous decisions the criterion that where
the legislature enacts a Sunday closing law applicable to a legiti-
mate occupation or business, it will be upheld if there is any reason-
able basis for distinguishing businesses affected from businesses
allowed to remain open. The court relied heavily on its finding that
the sale, ownership and use of automobiles have been the subjects
of numerous legislative enactments which have treated automobile
law as a separate and distinct category. In support of this finding
the court cited Gundaker Motors v. Gassert,10 a late 1956 New Jer-
sey case upholding a statute which outlawed the sale of automobiles
on Sundays, but allowed other businesses to remain open. In an
opinion by Chief Justice Vanderbilt, the New Jersey court had held
that the automobile business constitutes a "class" differing from
any other class, and since the statute treated persons within that
class fairiy and impartially, it did not violate the fourteenth amend-
ment. The courts of Nebraska" and Illinois"2 have upheld Sunday
closing laws for auto dealers. On the other hand, the Florida court
invalidated a general Sunday law which expressly exempted news-
papers, theatres, filling stations, restaurants, grocery and drug
stores, hotels, parking lots and transportation companies, but not
auto dealers and garages. 13 That classification was considered ar-
bitrary.
Those opposed to classification like that in the principal case
have objected that although the business regulated may differ fac-
tually from other businesses, mere factual difference should not be
the determinant. They argue that, in order to be held constitutional,
a classification must Dot only be reasonable and not arbitrary, but
must rest upon a difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation. This test was laid down by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Sea-
gram Distillers Corp.14 In other words, the fact that all within a
business or occupation are included within the terms of an act
should not be enough to validate the act. The validity of classifica-
tion should be determined by considering the objective of the legis-
lation. For example, if the objective is to limit the number of hours
worked, the classification should be broad enough to bring within
10 127 A.2d 566 (N. J. 1956).
" Stewart Motor Co. v. Omaha, 120 Neb. 776, 235 N. W. 332 (1931).
Is Humphrey Cherolet Co. a. City of Evonston, 7 Ill. Bluebook 2d 402, 131 N. E.2d 70 (1955).
1O Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1952).
'299 U. S. 183 (1936).
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it every business and avocation in order to prevent any person or
business from exceeding the limitations. If the object is to protect
Sunday as a day of rest, the statute should preclude all from work-
ing on Sundays. Of course, in those jurisdictions which have enact-
ed all-inclusive Sunday laws, certain works of necessity and charity
have been exempted for practical reasons. 5
Unfortunately neither the state nor the federal courts have fol-
lowed the rationale of the Old Dearborn case. It is apparent from
the cases previously mentioned that the Colorado court has not ap-
plied this principle, 6 but instead has rested its decisions on whether
a classification has brought within the operation of the law those
whose businesses were reasonably distinguishable from the busi-
nesses of other outside the statute, and whether it has forbidden all
competitors to remain open. However, a well written dissent in the
instant case indicated that Mr. Justice Sutton may have recognized
the distinction in rationales.
1 7
Mr. Justice Holmes, in Patersone v. Pennsylvania," declared,
"(A) state may classify with reference to the evil to
be prevented, and . . . if the class discriminated against is
or reasonably might be considered to define those from
whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly is picked
out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The ques-
tion is a practical one, dependent upon experience .... It is
not enough to invalidate the law that others may do the
same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter of fact, it is
found that the danger is characteristic of the class
named." 9
Mr. Justice Holmes' statement could be paraphrased to express
the reasoning of the Colorado court in the Mosko case, dealing with
the dangers which experience has shown to be particularly peculiar
to the automobile selling business so as to "mark the class." The
0 See, e. g., Ross v. State, 9 Ind. App. 35, 36 N. E. 167 (1894).
-6 See also, Smith Brooks Printing Co. v. Young, 103 Colo. 199, 35 P.2d 39 (1938); Rifle Potato
Growers v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937 (1925); Consumer's League v. Southern R. R. Co., 53
Colo. 54, 125 Poc. 577 (1912).
"7 309 P.2d at 597.
"232 U. S. 138 (1913).
"Id at 144. Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937); Bayside Fish Flour Co.
v. Gentry, 299 U. S. 422 (1936); People v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 (1928).
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United States Supreme Court has stated, in other cases, that a law
which hits the evil where it is most felt is not to be overthrown be-
cause there are other instances to which it might have applied.20
That Court has not passed upon the validity of Sunday closing laws
regulating automobile dealers. However, it upheld a Minnesota
statute which prohibited barbering on Sundays 21 and it appears
from prior decisions that the Court will uphold the kind of classifi-
cation inherent in auto dealer Sunday closing laws.
Related to the question whether Sunday closing laws are dis-
criminatory class legislation, is the question whether legislature en-
acting such laws are within their police power. Chief Justice Moore
raised this question in a dissent in the principal case.21 In any case
which involves class legislation, a consideration of whether the
legislature enacted the questioned statute in the interest of the pub-
lic health, welfare, safety and morals, is necessary. A law making
body has no power under the guise of police regulation to arbi-
trarily invade the personal rights and liberties of an individual
citizen.2 The Colorado Supreme Court, in the cases considered,
either expressly or impliedly held the enactment of Sunday closing
laws to be within the police power. That all-inclusive Sunday laws
are within the police power seems unquestionable, and, assuming
this, the argument that particular Sunday closing laws are void be-
cause of exceeding the police power is merely begging the question
of class legislation.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1834 declared it to be the practice of that Court not to hold
statutes unconstitutional by a bare majority.
2 4 Ohio, -2 Nebraska26
and North Dakota2 7 have constitutional provisions to the effect that
statutes cannot be declared unconstitutional by a bare majoriy de-
cision. The reasoning behind these provisions is particularly inter-
esting in regard to the instant case, in light of the initial holding by
a four to three decision that the statute was unconstitutional, and
the final holding, again four to three, that it was constitutional.
In Colorado as elsewhere a statute must be plainly, palpably
and beyond a reasonable doubt unconstitutional before a court may
invalidate it. 2t Can a statute which three out of seven judges con-
sider valid, be plainly, palpably and beyond a reasonable doubt un-
constitutional?
20 Pearson v. Probate Court, 308 U. S. 518 (1939); Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117 (1929).
2 Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. 5. 164 (1899).
="309 P.2d at 593.
" Chenoweth v. State Board, 57 Colo. 574, 141 Pac. 132 (1913).
"City of New York v. Miln, 11 U. S. (8 Pet.) 43 (1834).
'Ohio Const. art. 4, 2 (1912).
'Neb. Const. art. 5, 5 2 (1875).
'7 N. D. Const. art. 4, 5 89 (1918).
2"Eachus v. People, 124 Colo. 454, 238 P.2d 885 (1951); McClain v. People, 111 Colo. 271, 141
P.2d 685 (1943); People ex rel v. Barksdale, 104 Colo. 1, 87 P.2d 755 (1939); People ex rel v. Let-
ford, 102 Colo. 284, 76 P.2d 274 (1938).
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REAL PROPERTY - RELATIVE PRIORITY OF LIENS -
FEDERAL TAX LIEN PRIORITY: A JUDICIAL
FRANKENSTEIN
By DWIGHT SHELLMAN
Dwight Shellman is a freshman in the University of Denver
College of Law.
In the recent case of United States v. Vorreiter,' the Colorado
Supreme Court added its voice to the growing chorus of state
and federal3 court dissatisfaction with the United States Supreme
Court's absolutism in according federal tax liens priority over all
types of state liens.
4
In the Vorreiter case, one Price, a resident of Texas, contracted
with Vorreiter, a Colorado resident, for the improvement of Price's
Colorado realty. Prior to the making of this contract, the Collector
of Internal Revenue in Austin, Texas, received assessment lists for
taxes owed by Price to the United States. The Internal Revenue
Code has long accorded the United States a general lien for unpaid
taxes.5 Under the 1939 code, which governed, the tax lien arose at
the time the Collector received the assessment list6 and attached to
all property of the taxpayer,7 but was invalid against "any mort-
gagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor"8 unless recorded
in the office designated by state law. In the instant case, notice of
the federal lien was not filed in Colorado until after Vorreiter had
completed work under his contract and had filed a mechanics' lien
notice against Price's property. The Colorado statute9 grants the
mechanics' lien superiority over all prior and subsequent unrecord-
ed liens of which the mechanic's lien claimant has no notice.
In an action to foreclose the mechanics' lien, the Colorado Su-
preme Court found the subsequently arising but prior recorded me-
chanics' lien superior to the federal tax lien. The court reasoned:
(1) To give the federal tax lien priority would be to negate a set-
tled rule of Colorado property law, (2) The federal tax lien attaches
only to property owned by the taxpayer at the time the lien arises.
(3) To allow the Government to appropriate the inhanced value of
1307 P.2d 475 (Colo. 1957).
2E.g., United States v. Colotta, 79 So.2d 474 (Miss.), rev'd per curiam, 350 U. S. E08 (1955).
3 E. g., United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd per curiam,
350 U. S. 1010 (1956).
1 For excellent treatments of this whole problem, see Reeve, The Relative Priority of Gov-
ernment and Private Liens, 29 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 167 (1957); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the
Federal Government: The pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale L. J. 905 (1954).
SThe Internal Revenue Code of 1939. which governed the Vorreiter case, provided:
"§ 3670. Property subject to lien. If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses
to pay the some after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights thereto, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
a"§ 3671. Period of lien. ". . . (T)he lien shall arise at the tme the assessment list was re-
ceived by the collector and shall continue until the liability for such amount is satisfied or becomes
unenforceable by reason of lapse of time." Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322.
See note 6 supra.
8" § 3672. Validity against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors. (a) In'
validity of lien without notice. Such lien shall not be valid against any mortgcgee, pledgee, pur-
chaser or judgment creditor until notice has been filed by the collector...."
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86.3-6 (1953).
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the taxpayers' property would be to confiscate the work and ma-
terials of the mechanics' lienor to pay the taxes of another, con-
trary to the doctrine of unjust enrichment. (4) Chief Justice Moore,
specially concurring, asserted that the federal statutory exception
protecting mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors
without notice, should be broadened by interpretation to include
mechanics' lienors."
°
The result in the principal case directly contravenes the con-
struction the United States Supreme Court has given the tax lien
created by section 3670 of the 1939 code. As a review of its reason-
ing will demonstrate, the Colorado court pointedly omitted mention
of this long standing construction and the cases in which the United
States Supreme Court -established it.
(1) Settled Rule of Property. The cases cited by the Colorado
court to support its contention that the United States Supreme
Court will defer to state decisions which establish a settled rule of
property within that state, are clearly inapplicable." Indeed, United
States v. Snyder,12 the first Supreme Court decision to construe the
predecessor of section 3670,1" manifested no hesitation in invalidat-
ing a Louisiana recording statute which would have defeated the
federal lien as an unrecorded lien.' Moreover, the Constitution's
recitation of the federal power to tax,", when considered with the
supremacy clause,' seems decisive.
(2) Property Affected by the Tax Lien. The Colorado court's
theory that the federal lien attaches only to property owned by the
taxpayer when the lien arises is inconsistent with the Glass City
Bank case.'- There the United States Supreme Court held that the
federal tax lien applies to any property owned by a taxpayer at
any time during the life of the lien, although acquired after the lien
arises.
(3) Unjust Enrichment-Payment of Another's Taxes. The
Colorado court's contention that awarding the federal tax lien prior-
ity would unjustly enrich the United States, and, in effect, require
the mechanics' lienor to pay another's taxes, has great merit. The
Supreme Court, however, has consistently ignored this argument.
In point is the above mentioned Snyder case which involved a to-
bacco tax lien upon land. After the tax lien arose, the land was
conveyed to a good faith purchaser who had no notice of the lien.
When Snyder arose, the federal lien statute contained no provision
invalidating an unrecorded tax lien against "purchasers."'" The
question presented was whether the federal lien could be defeated
by a state recording statute. The answer, of course, was negative,
and the tax lien was foreclosed against the good faith purchaser.
10 307 P.2d at 479.
u The Colorado court cited Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458 (1925);
Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484 (1899) and Burcher v. Cheshire R. Co., 125 U. S 555 (1888), none
of which concerned matters of taxation or lien priorities.
12 149 U. S. 210 (1893).
13 Rev. Stat. § 3186 (1878), as amended, 20 Stat. 327, 331 (1879).
L .o. Const. art. 176 (1879).
'5 U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, subs. 1; U. S. Const. amend. XVI.
16 U. S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
17 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265 (1945).
"s20 Stat. 327, 331 (1879), amended, 37 Stat. 1016 (1913), (lien made invalid without notice
against mortgagees, purchasers or judgment creditors), amended, 45 Stat. 875 (1928) (added pledgees
to those protected from unrecorded lien).
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Following this severe precedent, the Supreme Court has frequently
applied the theory that the federal tax lien statute creates a secret,
general lien"9 valid, without regard to notice, against all subsequent
lienors who cannot bring themselves within the enumerated excep-
tions.20 Moreover, where it has appeared that a state lien was first
in time to the federal tax lien, the Court has gone to great lengths
to find an "imperfection" in the state lien sufficient to defeat its
priority.2 Although in the Vorreiter case, the Colorado mechanics'
lien did not even enjoy the dubious distinction of being first in
time, the cases establishing the doctrine of "perfection" illustrate
the Court's historic indifference to these arguments advanced by
the Colorado court in favor of Vorreiter's lien.
(4) Lienor as Mortgagee, Pledgee, Purchaser and Judgment
Creditor. Although the terms "mortgagee" and "pledgee" are ob-
viously inapplicable, various attempts have been made to fit state
lienors into the categories of "purchaser" and "judgment creditor."
Nevertheless, by Supreme Court definition, a purchaser is one who
acquires title or possession, in the manner of vendor and vendee,
for a valuable consideration,'2 while a judgment creditor is one who
has received a judgment from a court of record.
2
3
The Vorreiter case represents a state court's justifiable exas-
peration with the inequities inherent in the United States Supreme
Court's unrealistic and severe interpretation of the federal tax lien
law. To understand how the Supreme Court's interpretation has dis-
torted the language of section 3670, it is necessary to consider an-
other federal statute, section 3466 of the Revised Statutes.24 Section
3466 grants the United States first priority for debts due it from an
insolvent. The priority attaches when the debtor's property passes
to a third person (other than a trustee in bankruptcy) for distribu-
tion to creditors. Section 3466 creates no lien. It merely bestows a
priority to inusre that any debts due the United States will first be
satisfied.2'
'0 Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank-
340 U. S. 47, 51 (1950), traced the history of the § 3670 lien and approved the contention thc-t it
created a secret general lien.
SMackenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1940).
"1 United States v. Liverpool & L.&G. Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 215 (1955) (garnishment lien sunerserfed
by a subsequently arising tax lien that was recorded before judgment); United States v. Acri. 343
U. S. 211 (1955) (state lien contingent upon outcome of wrongful death action); United Stvtes v.
Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953) (prior city tax lein); United St'e, v. Security Trust &
Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47 (1950); New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290 (1933) (prior unliquidated
state franchise taxes).
, United States v. Scovil, 348 U. S. 218, 221 (1955); and see United States v. Kings County Iron
Works, 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955).
United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953).
24 Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U. S. C. § 191 (1952).
' Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611 (1948). The lower federal courts have held that
neither § 3466 nor § § 3670-2 apply to proceedings in bankruptcy, reasoning that to so cpply them
would upset the scheme of distribution set out in the Bankruptcy Act. See United States v. Samp.ell,
153 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946), and cases cited there. Re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 163 F.2d 808 (6th
Cir. 1948), appears to fall within this classification, but was cited by the Colorado court to support its
unjust enrichment argument in Vorreiter. 307 P.2d at 478.
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Early cases construing section 3466 apparently gave no credence
to the theory that it created an absolute preference in favor of the
United States to override antecedent liens. 26 However the twentieth
century saw a growing tendency on the part of the Supreme Court
to require that a state lien be "perfected" before it could compete
with the federal priority for the funds of an insolvent. 27 The Court
further implemented this growing doctrine by holding that the is-
sue of perfection is, in the final analysis, a federal question."'
In Illinois ex rel Gordon v. Campbell" the Court reviewed and
enumerated the elements which previous decisions had considered
necessary to perfect a state lien. These were: (1) certainty of the
identity of the lienor; (2) certainty as to the amount of the lien;
(3) specific property attached by the lien, and (4) title to or posses-
sion of the affected property.2 0 A lien deficient in any of these at-
tributes when the federal priority arose was considered merely "a
caveat of a more perfect lien to come."'1 Whether a sufficiently per-
fected state lien would in fact prevail over the federal priority is,
as yet, merely conjectural. Because all the state liens yet to come
before the Court have been found imperfct in some respect2 2 this
important question has been reserved for later treatment.
The doctrinal armour of section 3466, with its almost unattain-
able standards, appears to have been transferred to the section 3670
tax lien in United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank.2 8
There a federal tax lien arose before a prior attaching creditor had
pursued his lien to judgment. The Court held that since perfection
of the creditor's lien was contingent on judgment, the federal lien
must prevail.
However a ray of hope was extended to state lienors in United
States v. New Britain,3 where the Court found that certain city tax
Kennedy, note 4 supra at 907.
Steps in this development were: Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 (1929); New
York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290 (1933); and United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 (1941).
"United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U. S. 353 (1945). But cf. Spokane County
v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 (1929) (assumed the contrary).
m 329 U. S. 362, 375, 376 (1946).
" See United States v. Gilbert associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953), where this last unique re-
quirement of possession defeated a city's prior and otherwise specific liens for taxes.
.1 New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 294 (1933).
"E. g., United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953).
"340 U. S. 47 (1950).
"347 U. S. 81 (1954).
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and water rent liens sufficiently met the standards of identity, cer-
tainty of amount and specificity of the property attached to defeat
a subsequently arising federal tax lien under the common law rule
of "first in time is first in right." In this case, as in all others in-
volving unforeclosed liens, the city had neither title nor possession
of the property to which its lien had attached. The Court's disre-
gard of what had been a fatal defect in cases concerning the section
3466 priority 3 suggested a difference in application of the doctrine
to the section 3670 lien.
6
Unfortunately, the bright ray extended by New Britain seems
to have been extinguished by United States v. White Bear Brewing
Co.,y7 where a mechanics' lien was recorded and in the process of
enforcement before the federal lien arose, but the federal lien was
recorded before judgmnt foreclosing the mechanics' lien was en-
tered. The Supreme Court, without opinion, reversed the Seventh
Circuit which had held for the mechanics' lienor. Since the White
Bear Brewing Co. lien appeared to meet the New Britain require-
ments, the logical inference is to mark New Britain as a departure
from, and White Bear Brewing Co. as a return to, application of the
section 3466 doctrine of perfection to the section 3670 lien."
The unsoundness of this result was pointed out by Judge Fin-
negan in his opinion for the Seventh Circuit in White Bear Brewing
Co.39 He noted that since the United States is a government of dele-
gated powers, it enjoys no sovereign prerogative of priority of pay-
ment. In the absence of federal common law, whatever priority the
United States claims must exist by virtue of statute. 40 To Judge
Finnegan, the absence of a priority provision in section 3670 indi-
cated Congress' intention not to render the federal tax lien absolute.
He might have further observed that, although section 3670 refers
simply to "a lien" for unpaid taxes, only a tortured reading can con-
strue "a lien" to mean what the United States Supreme Court has
attributed to the section 3670 tax lien.
If this judicial legislation is what the Colorado court protested
in the Vorreiter case, its exasperation is reasonable. If, however,
the Colorado court protested the secret floating lien which unfairly
deprives a creditor of his just debt, without notice or compensation,
the question becomes one of due process, which should have been
raised and decided. 4 1 Perhaps a more satisfactory solution would be
Congressional action requiring fair notice of the federal tax lien, or,
as has been suggested, 2 a system of priorities similar to that in the
Bankruptcy Act.
Compare New Britain with United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953). The
facts appear indistinguishable, although the cases were distinguished.
W Kennedy, note 4 supra at 929-30.
= 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955), rerv'd per curiam, 350 U. 5. 1010, rehearing denied, 351 U. S. 958
(1956).
See Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent in United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U. S. 1010
(1956).
Se United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955).
Quoting Mr. Justice Story in United States v. State Bank, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 (1832).
41 Although due process was briefly mentioned in Chief Justice Moore's concurring opinion (307
P.2d at 479), a discussion of this point was conspicuously absent from the majority opinion.
42 Kennedy, note 4 supra at 930.
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